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CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL IN
CALIFORNIA: THE LANTERMAN-
PETRIS-SHORT ACT
A possible conversation between an "enlightened" man and his son
in the Middle Ages:
Q. What is a madman?
A. A madman is a person possessed by devils.
Q. What happens to a madman?
A. The evil spirit must be exorcised from him. This is accom-
plished by beating or burning the madman. Sometimes it is
even necessary to drill a hole in his skull to permit the demon
to escape.
Q. Where does this exorcism take place?
A. In a jail or dungeon. Since the demon might leave the mad-
man and contaminate others, it is necessary to confine the mad-
man and to chain him securely.
Q. But aren't jails and dungeons places where criminals are locked
up?
A. Yes.
Q. Then what is the difference in the way we handle madmen from
criminals?
A. Ask your mother.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year several hundred thousand people are admitted to mental
institutions, 2 mostly on an involuntary basis.3  One out of every two
1. Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, in THE MENTALLY ILL AN)
THE RIrHT TO TREATMENT 109 (G. Morris ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
2. Estimates of the number of individuals committed through civil proceedings each
year range from 250,000 to 500,000. See T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 40
(1963) [hereinafter cited as SzAsz]; Comment, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights
of the Incarcerated Mentally 111, 1969 DuKE L.J. 677, 681.
3. About 90% of the individuals in mental hospitals have been admitted involuntar-
ily. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HIv.
L. REV. 1288 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment]. Actually, this figure
may be misleadingly low. The term "voluntary" is often used as an euphemism for
a process, which as Dr. Thomas Szasz of the State University of New York has ex-
plained, is actually coercive:
This so-called voluntary admission to a mental hospital is a procedure, which
more often than not could be paraphrased as follows. It is as if the patient were
told: "If you don't go to the hospital by signing this piece of paper, then we'll get
you in by having someone else sign another piece of paper."
KATZ, GOLDSTEIN, & DERsHowITz PsYcHoANALYsIs, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 475 (1967).
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hospital beds in this country contains a mental patient,4 and one out
of every twelve Americans will spend at least a few days of his or
her life in a mental institution.5 Yet, the process of civil commitment
too often operates as a system that would shock common ideas of fair
play and justice if applied in the criminal courts. When the individuals
involved are not criminals, but those who have been declared "mentally
ill," the cry for due process suddenly grows faint." While almost every
racial, ethnic, political, and sexual group in the American culture is
achieving new levels of success in the area of basic human rights, in-
voluntarily admitted mental patients remain close to legal impotency.
They are possibly the most disadvantaged people in our society.7
The musty files of the institutions to which these persons are com-
mitted contain many case histories as disturbing as the following:
In Chicago a Polish immigrant discovered a sum of money missing
from her apartment. Since the building janitor was the only person
other than her husband who had a key to the apartment, she sus-
pected him of taking the money and confronted him with an accusa-
tion of theft. The janitor telephoned the police and, upon their ar-
rival, stated that the woman and her husband were insane. The
police took the couple in handcuffs to the Cook County Mental Health
Clinic. A "hearing" was held. The immigrants had but a rudi-
mentary knowledge of English and were not provided with counsel.
They were pronounced mentally ill and committed to the Chicago
State Hospital. Bewildered, frightened, and confused by his sudden
inexplicable imprisonment, the husband, who had spent time in a con-
centration camp during World War II, hanged himself during the sixth
week of his confinement.8
4. See Morris, Introduction, in THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
at vii (G. Morris ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Introduction].
5. See Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Nebraska, 48 Na. L. REv.
255 (1968).
6. See Introduction, supra note 4, at vii.
7. Id.
8. Johnson, Due Process in Involuntary Civil Commitment and Incompetency Adjudi-
cation Proceedings: Where Does Colorado Stand?, 46 DENVER L.J. 516, 521-22 (1969)
(footnote omitted). Other cases might be illustrative:
Mhe plaintiff had been a patient in the Allentown State Hospital for the In-
sane for 10 years. He had been diagnosed as a manic depressive. In the words
of the court, he was a "raving maniac" at the zenith of his anxiety. Part of the
prescribed psychiatric therapy.., was the application of wet packs. This treat-
ment supposedly rendered extremely agitated patients calm by the soothing effects
of warm water.. . . After extensive use of the wet packs, the patient developed
severe blisters on his hands. The blisters were opened by a doctor, using an un-
sterilized pocketknife. [The patient then] developed severe infections in both
hands ....
The court denied any recovery for a 60 percent impairment in the use of his
hands following the infection.
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This example, while admittedly an extreme case, reflects some of the
disturbing features that have characterized the administration of Ameri-
can psychiatric justice. In an attempt to achieve what is basically a
medical goal, i.e., providing treatment to those who may be mentally
ill, personal liberty is taken with far fewer safeguards than would be
found in the criminal justice system." Civil commitment has often been
characterized as one of concern only to the medical profession and
therefore not of interest to the law.'0 Commenting on this unfortunate
Comment, The Expanding Role of the Lawyer and the Court in Securing Psychiatric
Treatment for Patients Confined Pursuant to Civil Commitment Procedures, 6 HoUsToN
L. REv. 519, 525 (1969) (footnote omitted). In the case from which this example
was taken, Powell v. Risser, 99 A.2d 454 (Pa. 1953), Justice Musmanno, in a dissent-
ing opinion, commented on the "snake-pit" atmosphere then existing in the mental
health field:
The assumed therapeutics administered to the plaintiff in this case read like the
chronicle of a medieval torture .... mhe unnecessary or reckless use of violent
measures which steal away physical assets from one already robbed of the treas-
ures of a sound mind constitutes a misdeed which humanity abhors, justice con-
demns and the law should correct.
Id. at 458. Still another example is given in Wexler & Scoville, The Administration of
Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 Aiuz. L. REV. 1 (1971) (here-
inafter cited as ARtzoNrA PROJECr]. They describe the case of a Mexican-American
woman taken into custody on January 22, 1912, for a mental condition purportedly
caused by "bathing in cold water at menstrual period." She was still confined to the
state hospital 59 years later. Id. at 1-2.
9. See Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, in THE MEN-
TALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 3 (G. Morris ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
at Katz]; Kaplan, Civil Commitment "As You Like It," 49 B.U.L. REv. 14 (1969).
Kaplan writes: "'Mental Illness' is the triggering conclusionary phrase which allows
the state to legally remove an individual involuntarily to an institution for treatment
despite the fact that he has not violated a criminal statute." Id. at 16.
Medical and legal aspects of civil commitment tend to conflict, thus compelling leg-
islatures to forge a compromise between the medical goal of treatment without delay
and the legal requirement of due process. The latter, of course, often results in delay.
See Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 673, 464 P.2d 56, 61, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600,
605 (1970).
10. See Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State
Mental Hospital: A Confrontation of Professions, 10 J. HEAITH & SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 66
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Wenger & Fletcher]:
"It is the official position of the American Psychiatric Association that physicians
should have unrestricted power to commit." The medical profession believes
"provisions should be made for involuntary hospitalization without the necessity of
court proceedings."...
Lawyers, on the other hand, argue that the situation is not that simple. They
state that the problem is basically a legal one due to the loss of civil liberties which
results from commitment. The legal profession appears to view the mental hos-
pital as a "corrective institution," similar to a prison, whose main functions are
incarceration, custodial care, and rehabilitation. The due process of law must be
served if anyone is committed to such an institution.
Id. at 67 (citations and footnotes omitted), quoting SZAsz, supra note 2, at 61 and H.
DAviDsoN, FORENSIC PsycHrATRY 282 (1965). This quotation seems to imply that
due process is required only when a person is committed to an institution which is the
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approach, Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School noted
that:
Civil commitment of the mentally ill is a legal problem; whenever
compulsion is used or freedom denied-whether by the state, the
church, the union, the university, or the psychiatrist-the issue be-
comes a legal one, and lawyers must be quick to immerse themselves in
it. But the issue is not for lawyers alone: The average person can
predict with some confidence that he will never stand accused of com-
mitting some serious crime. Can he be as confident that he will never
confront the process of commitment?"
The history of civil commitment in California has generally paralleled
that of other jurisdictions, 12 although some early attempts at defining
and safeguarding the rights of mental patients were made. For instance,
in 1901, the California supreme court, in Matter of Lambert,"3 held
certain provisions of the Insanity Law of 1897 unconstitutional on due
process grounds. As the statute was written, the first notice the person
had of the proceedings was provided when the person was taken into
custody by the sheriff for delivery to the institution to which he or she
was being committed.' 4 As a result of this case, California law at
least incorporated the element of notice to the individual being com-
mitted, but it still retained many characteristics which could be consid-
ered fundamentally unfair, the most important of which was the provi-
sion for indeterminate commitment.' 5
The past decade has been a period when interest in the plight of
the mentally ill has begun to increase in the legal community. 10 The
functional equivalent of a jail, i.e., an institution whose main functions are "incarcera-
tion, custodial care, and rehabilitation." It is submitted that most attorneys would
argue, if asked, that due process is required whenever a person is deprived of liberty
irrespective of the reason for the deprivation or the function of the institution to
which the person is sent.
11. Dershowitz, Two Models of Commitment: The Medical and the Legal, THE Hu-
MANisT, July-Aug. 1971, at 19, 23 [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz]. It should be
noted that, despite its use by many authors (see, e.g., the titles of the articles cited
in notes 2 & 8 supra), the term "involuntary commitment" is an unnecessary redun-
dancy: People never voluntarily "commit" themselves to hospitals.
12. See Projects-Civil Commitment of the Mentally ill, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 822
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Projects].
13. 134 Cal. 626, 66 P. 851 (1901).
14. Id. at 627, 66 P. at 851-52.
15. See Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible
Side-Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 102
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Abramson].
16. Introduction, supra note 4, at viii. The use of the term "mentally ill" presup-
poses resolution of the controversy as to whether or not those who deviate from so-
ciety's norms can really be classified as "ill" in the medical sense. See text accom-
panying notes 74-80 infra. Likewise, referring to these individuals as "patients," "de-
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trend is reflected in California by the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act,'7
which became operative as part of California's Community Mental
Health Services Law' s on July 1, 1969.19 This Act (hereinafter LPS)
fendants," and "inmates" may seem confusing and, at times, inappropriate. For the
purposes of this discussion, however, the words are to be used interchangeably to refer
to individuals caught in the processes of psychiatric justice.
17. CAL. WELF. & INSr'NS CODE ANN. §§ 5000-01 (West 1972).
18. Division 5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code titled Community
Mental Health Services, was added by the California Mental Health Act of 1967, ch.
1667, § 36, [1967] Cal. Stat. Reg. Sess. 4074. Part 1 is the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act (CAL. WELF. & INSr'NS CODE ANN. §§ 5000 et seq. (West 1972)). It became op-
erative as amended by ch. 1374, § 13, [1968] Cal. Stat. Reg. Sess. 2640 on July 1, 1969.
Part 2 is a modification of the Short-Doyle Act of 1957 (CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE ANN. §§ 5600 et seq. (West 1972)). It became operative as amended by ch.
989, § 2, [1968] Cal. Stat. Reg. Sess. 1912 on July 1, 1969; except for U9 5604, 5650,
5658, 5659, 5756, 5760, and 5763, which became operative on the 61st day after final
adjournment of the 1968 Regular Session. The Short-Doyle Act functions as enabling
legislation for the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. It is designed:
[rio organize and finance community mental health services for the mentally dis-
ordered in every county through locally administered and locally controlled com-
munity mental health programs. It is furthermore intended to better utilize exist-
ing resources at both the state and local levels in order to improve the effective-
ness of necessary mental health services; to integrate state-operated and commun-
ity mental health programs into a unified mental health system; to ensure that all
mental health professions be appropriately represented and utilized in such mental
health programs; to provide a means for participation by local governments in the
determination of the need for and the allocation of mental health resources; to es-
tablish a uniform ratio of local and state government responsibility for financing
mental health services; and to provide a means of allocating state mental health
funds according to community needs. It is furthermore intended to provide -a
means of reimbursing local governments for certain services to the mentally fe-
tarded and persons afflicted with alcoholism which counties may elect to provide.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5600 (West 1972).
19. Judge Hugo Fisher declared LPS unconstitutional in San Diego v. Superior Court,
Civ. No. 1276 (Super. Ct., San Diego County, July 3, 1969), just two days after the
Act went into effect. On appeal to the California supreme court (County of San Diego
v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 677, 464 P.2d 63, 83 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1970)), Justice
Burke, in a memorandum opinion handed down the same day as Thorn v. Superior
Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970), wrote:
[Eugene Callahan sought habeas corpus relief] on the ground that provisions of
the act permitting him to be detained for 14 days on certificate of a physician
without prior notice, court hearing, or advice as to right to counsel or appointment
of counsel, deprived him of due process ...
However, as noted in Thorn v. Superior Court, the act has now been amended to
require that a certified patient be informed of his right to counsel including court-
appointed counsel; and the relevant issues are discussed in Thorn. Additionally,
it appears that Callahan has long since been released, and that no useful purpose
would be served by further proceedings with respect to his certification.
1 Cal. 3d at 678, 464 P.2d at 64, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (citation omitted). In Thorn,
Justice Burke, writing for a unanimous court, held that the superior court acted
within its jurisdiction in ordering the hospital to permit the legal staff of a non-
profit corporation to visit patients detained for 14-day intensive treatment under LPS,
and that the superior court was justified in directing the staff to act as attorney for
such detained persons. A psychiatric foundation, devoted to the care and treatment
of such patients had sought to nullify the superior court order. 1 Cal. 3d at 676,
464 P.2d at 63, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
was the culmination of a two-year legislative study, and was designed
to establish new procedures for the civil commitment of mentally ill
persons and to safeguard their legal rights after commitment2 0 The
specific goals the legislature was trying to achieve are outlined in sec-
tion 5001 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code:
(a) To end the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commit-
ment of mentally disordered persons and persons impaired by chronic
alcoholism, and to eliminate legal disabilities;
(b) To provide prompt evaluation and treatment of persons with
serious mental disorders or impaired by chronic alcoholism;
(c) To guarantee and protect public safety;
(d) To safeguard individual rights through judicial review;
(e) To provide individualized treatment, supervision, and placement
services by a conservatorship program for gravely disabled persons;
(f) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional
personnel and public funds to accomplish these objectives and to pre-
vent duplication of services and unnecessary expenditures. 21
20. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUB-
COMMITrEE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS
IN CALIFORNIA: A BACKGROUND DOCUMENT (1966) [hereinafter cited as DILEMMA
OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS]. In Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d
56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970), the court stated:
The LPS act, as enacted in 1967 after a two-year legislative study, and there-
after amended, repealed the principal provisions for the civil commitment of men-
tally ill persons found in prior California law and replaced them by a new statu-
tory scheme repealing the indeterminate commitment, removing the legal disabili-
ties previously imposed upon persons adjudicated to be mentally ill, and enacting
an extensive scheme of community-based services, emphasizing voluntary treat-
ment and providing for periods of involuntary observation and crisis treatment for
persons who are unable to care for themselves or whose condition makes them a
danger to themselves or others.
Id. at 668, 464 P.2d at 57, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 601. The legislative study which even-
tually led to the enactment of LPS was based on information obtained from public
hearings, interviews, and a survey of more than 300 hospitals. Data was gathered on
83% of all the hospitalized psychiatric patients in California. ENKI RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNiA'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH LAW 12 (1969-1971) [herein-
after cited as ENKI REPORT]. For a summary of the legislative committee findings,
see id. at 12-14.
See generally, Abramson, supra note 15; Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treat-
ment, in Tm MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 108 (G. Morris ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as Bazelon]; Fuller, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Cali-
Jornia: 1969 Style, 10 SANTA CLARA LAw. 74 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Fuller].
It should be noted that LPS does not use the term "commitment." See CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5008.1 (West Supp. 1973), where the term "judicial commitment"
is limited to non-LPS procedures. Instead, "evaluation" and "certification" are the
terms of art selected by the legislature. See text accompanying notes 25-54 infra. De-
spite this semantic shuffling, individuals are still "committed" as that term is norm-
ally understood, and it will be used throughout this Comment.
21. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5001 (West 1972). All textual references
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This Comment will attempt to evaluate the legislature's success in
fulfilling these commendable goals. Analytically, this evaluation will
proceed by studying five areas: (1) commitment standards; (2)
right to treatment; (3) release from hospitalization; (4) role of the
psychiatrist; and (5) role of counsel.2" Prerequisite to an assessment
of the impact of LPS on each of these areas, however, is an under-
standing of its procedural aspects.
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF LPS
The Act in general applies to persons who are dangerous to them-
selves or others or "gravely disabled" due to "mental disorder," al-
though it explicitly does not cover sex offenders, criminal offenders,
or those suffering from chronic alcoholism.2" The statute also excludes
from its coverage epileptics and the mentally retarded. 4
A mentally disordered person subject to the provisions of the Act
can enter the LPS scheme in several ways. Under section 5150, he
or she may, for reasonable cause, be taken into custody by a peace offi-
cer, a member of the staff of a designated "evaluation facility," i.e.,
the mental hospital or institution in the county to which persons are
civilly committed, or by a professional person otherwise designated by
the county.25 This section was apparently designed to give police offi-
cers the power to take a person into custody when the person's behavior
indicates to the police that he or she may be in need of psychiatric help.
It thus makes no provision for a hearing prior to the detention. After
the person is in custody, a written application is made to an appropriate
facility, where the person is then detained for evaluation and treat-
ment.28 Section 5170 also allows police officers and professionals to
commit persons for a short period of time if they are mentally disabled
because of inebriation.
Sections 5200-5206 provide a method by which a person may be
"given an evaluation," i.e., committed for a short term, at the request
of someone other than a police officer or professional. In this case, the
to sections are to the California Welfare and Institutions Code Annotated unless
otherwise noted.
22. To be sure, the five categories overlap considerably, but these divisions, never-
theless, provide a workable conceptual framework with which to examine the process
of civil commitment.
23. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5002 (West 1972).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 5150 (West Supp. 1973).
26. Id.
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person desiring the mentally disordered person to be committed 27 re-
quests a county-designated agency2 8 to prepare a petition for evalua-
tion.29  This petition is screened by another agency80 to assure that
there is probable cause to believe the allegations.3 1 Upon approval by
this second agency, the petition is filed in superior court, and, assuming
the judge of that court is satisfied that the person being committed is in
fact mentally disabled, an order is issued requiring the person to be
evaluated.
32
Although section 5002 explicitly states that LPS does not modify
any law relating to the commitment of mentally disordered criminal of-
fenders, section 5225 allows a judge to commit a criminal defendant in
a manner similar to that countenanced by sections 5200-5206, if the
defendant is believed to be mentally disordered because of alcoholism
or use of drugs.
Finally, section 6551 (not part of LPS) allows wards of the juvenile
court to be committed according to the procedures outlined in section
5150; section 4011.6 of the Penal Code allows persons in charge of
jails to commit prisoners pursuant to section 5150;11 and section 1370
of the Penal Code provides that persons charged with a crime, but un-
able to stand trial because of their insanity, shall be "subject to the pro-
visions" of LPS in the event the criminal charges against them are drop-
ped before they regain their sanity.34
In all these cases, the "evaluation" period is 72 hours. If, in the
opinion of the staff, the patient does not require further evaluation or
treatment, he or she may be released before or at the end of the 72
hours. The professional in charge of the facility, however, may certify
the person for further detention, if the medical staff feels the patient is
still mentally disabled, the patient refuses to remain on a voluntary ba-
sis, and the facility is properly equipped to treat that type of disability.80
Notice of the certification for the continued detention must be given to
the patient,3 7 who also must be informed of the right to counsel and to
27. The person requesting the petition, of course, would normally be a relative.
28. The code does not further specify the agency which will perform this function.
29. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5201 (West 1972).
30. The screening agency is selected by the county and the State Department of
Health. Id. § 5202 (West Supp. 1973).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 5206 (West 1972).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4011.6 (West 1972).
34. Id. § 1370.
35. CAL. WEtrF. & INSV'NS CODE ANN. §H 5151, 5206, 5230 (West 1972).
36. Id. § 5250.
37. Id. H8 5251, 5253 (West Supp. 1973).
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judicial review by habeas corpus.3 8  The detention period under this
certification is fourteen days.39
At the end of this initial 17 days, the procedures which must be fol-
lowed in order to retain the person in custody depend on the particular
category of mental disability into which the patient has been placed.
If the person has threatened or has attempted to cause actual physical
harm to others and presents "an imminent threat of substantial physical
harm to others," then the professional in charge may petition the court
for a judicial commitment. 40  A hearing is held to determine whether
or not the person should be further detained, with the right to a jury
being provided.41 If the trier of fact determines that further detention
is necessary, the person is committed for 90 days.42 At the end of this
period, the patient must be released unless he or she has again been
demonstrably assaultive during the confinement.43 If the patient has
engaged in dangerous conduct, a new petition for treatment may be
filed.44 Thus, a person who is dangerous to others and who has been
committed will receive automatic judicial review (with the right to a
jury trial) every 90 days until released.45
Persons who are dangerous to themselves may be committed for
an additional 14 days after the initial 17 day period, but further
confinement is predicated on reclassifying them as either "danger-
ous to others" or "gravely disabled. '46
38. Id. § 5252.1 (West 1972).
39. Id. § 5250.
40. Id. § 5304.
41. Id. § 5303.
42. Id. § 5304.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. This leaves open the possibility of a person having a jury trial every three
months for years on end. This result, however, is highly unlikely, since the provisions
for 90 day commitments have been seldom used. See ENKI REPORT, supra note 20,
at 154. According to Dr. Victor G. Haddox, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, Insti-
tute of Psychiatry, Law and Behavioral Science, School of Medicine, University of
Southern California, none of the approximately 3000 LPS hearings in which he has
testified involved a person who was being certified for a 90 day detention. Interview
with Dr. Victor G. Haddox, Nov. 5, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Interview].
46. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. §§ 5260-68 (West 1972). The involuntary
reclassification provision is found in § 5264, which states that suicidal persons must
be released after the second 14 day period unless they can be recommended for a con-
servatorship or unless "Article 6" of the Act, relating to the continued detention of
persons dangerous to others, is applicable to the person. In order for the first excep-
tion to apply, the person must, by the terms of the Act, be gravely disabled. The
second exception obviously requires that the person be found to be dangerous to others.
Despite this straight-forward construction of the statutory scheme, some courts have
1974]
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If the person in charge of the evaluation facility determines that a
patient is "gravely disabled 47 and in need of further aid, he or she may
petition the court for the appointment of a conservator.48 Under the
conservatorship program, the patient may either be allowed to live out-
side the hospital,40 with the power in the conservator to commit if the
conservator deems it necessary,5" or the person may be indefinitely hos-
pitalized. During the entire course of the conservatorship, the patient
has the right to judicial review of his or her status (although no more
often than once every six months)51 with automatic judicial review
being required once per year.2 Again, the right to a jury trial on
the issue of the patient's continuing mental disability is guaranteed by
LPS.
Irrespective of the category of mental disability into which they are
placed, committed individuals retain certain rights under the California
legislative scheme, including the right to wear their own clothes, keep
apparently not permitted reclassification of persons initially detained as being a danger
to themselves. Interview, supra note 45.
47. See notes 90-92 infra and accompanying text.
48. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5352 (West Supp. 1973).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 5358. The conservator usually is a public agency, rather than an indi-
vidual. In addition, the qualifications of a conservator are applied differently through-
out the state:
In practice the conservatorship procedure requires two phases: a temporary con-
servatorship obtained by the hospital at the end of the certification period to al-
low time for conservatorship investigation, and the court hearing to grant the con-
servatorship. The request for a temporary conservatorship is usually approved by
courts without any hearing or review.
In California there is a distinction between conservatorship and guardianship. Both
apply to responsibility for the person and estate, but conservatorship allows for
involuntary placement of the conservatee, and is limited to one year with annual
review possible. Because of the one year time limitation in conservatorship, the
individual's property may not be liquidated as readily as under guardianship. The
legal authorities involved-usually a Public Guardian's Office-utilize a staff
whose members have experience in real estate, stocks, bonds, etc.
The qualifications of public conservator differ in some counties. In Los Angeles
a deputy public guardian was required to have one year of social service experi-
ence. Previously, staff had been divided into those handling conservatorship and
those handling guardianship, but in March, 1970 these functions were combined
for each worker. This allowed the worker to follow through on each case, regard-
less of whether it developed into a guardianship or conservatorship situation.
In San Francisco the roles of public guardian and conservator, by contrast, were
separated. If a patient was in need of care or placement, the conservator pro-
vided services. If a patient was in need of financial management, the public
guardian handled this. If both services were needed, the patient was served by
both.
In San Mateo, investigation for conservatorship was done by the mental health
system (contracted by the public guardian) to make the initial critical determina-
tion as to whether conservatorship was indicated. The public guardian then fol-
lowed-up on the case.
EN REPORT, supra note 20, at 156-57.
51. CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE ANN. § 5364 (West 1972).
52. Id. § 5361.
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their own possessions, spend their own money, have space to store
possessions, see visitors, make telephone calls, and mail and receive un-
opened correspondence. 53 Even these rights, however, may be denied
for "good cause" by the professional in charge of the facility, and the
statute requires neither hearing nor notice before such a decision is im-
plemented. LPS gives the patient a qualified right to refuse electric
shock treatment and an absolute right to refuse a lobotomy.
54
This, then, is a capsulized description of the LPS procedural ap-
paratus. The potential problems with the system are apparent: What
do "dangerous to others," "gravely disabled," and "dangerous to self"
mean? Is informing a mentally disabled person of the right to counsel
and review by habeas corpus an effective method of protecting those
rights? What are the attitudes and roles of the psychiatrists and law-
yers in this scheme? What should they be?
]II. LPS: ARE TIE SAFEGUARDS SUFFICIENT?
A. Commitment Standards
The statutes of virtually every state define potential candidates for
civil commitment in terms of one or both of two general classifica-
tions:55 "dangerous"'5'5 and "need for treatment.'5 7  The particular
justification employed is important since it has a bearing in subsequent
stages of the process."
53. Id. § 5325 (West Supp. 1973).
54. Id. It should be noted that "good cause" is nowhere defined in the Act. Also,
until the passage of Assembly Bill 47 (ch. 959 CAL. STATS. [September 30, 1973]),
the psychiatrist could deny the patient's request to refuse a lobotomy. The bill, how-
ever, grants the patient an absolute right to refuse that form of treatment.
55. See generally Projects, supra note 12; ARrzoNA PROJECT, supra note 8.
56. This uniformity may be a reflection of the traditional definition of "insanity"
as "a disease or discord of the mind which renders its victim dangerous to himself
or to others." Aponte v. State, 153 A.2d 665, 669 (N.J. 1959). See also Marschall,
A Critique of the "Right to Treatment" Approach, in THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE
RIGHT TO TRETmErNT 37, 40 (G. Morris ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Marschall].
57. See generally Marschall, supra note 56. The distinction between the "need for
treatment" and the "right to treatment" doctrine (see text accompanying notes 107-53
infra), must be kept clearly in mind. The former is a commitment standard. The
"right to treatment" doctrine, on the other hand, involves the patient's rights after
commitment, whether it be based on a need for treatment, dangerousness, or a crim-
inal standard.
58. When the justification for commitment is the individual's need of treatment, the
decision as to whether or not confinement should continue may depend on whether
or not treatment is in fact provided. When a person is committed on a prediction
of dangerousness, courts may qualify the "right to treatment" approach in an effort to
protect the community.
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The prediction that a person is a danger to himself or others con-
stitutes one of the more often cited reasons for the issuance of a commit-
ment order, 9 the theory being that both the community and the patient
need protection.60 There are those who maintain that this is an unjusti-
fiable standard because the mentally ill persons, on balance, are no
more dangerous than the rest of the population. 1 But assuming the
state has a valid interest in isolating and confining dangerous persons,
whether mentally ill or perfectly sane, the question becomes one of iden-
tifying which persons actually pose a threat to themselves or to the
other members of society. 62 This, of course, requires that a prediction
of the person's future behavior be made. Since the result of a predic-
tion of dangerousness is the deprivation of the person's liberty, i.e., com-
mitment, the due process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments must be satisfied.6 3  If in criminal law, those requirements
are met only by proof "beyond a reasonable doubt,"' 4 by analogy, a
mental patient should be committed only when the trier of fact"5 be-
lieves that the prediction that a patient will be dangerous has been
shown to be true "beyond a reasonable doubt."66 Even a psychiatrist
59. See ENKI RPORT, supra note 20, at 116. That study shows that, depending
on the city and time period selected, between 31 and 55 percent of admissions are
based on dangerousness. Approximately 60 percent of those admitted on this basis
are dangerous to themselves, and only 40 percent are dangerous to others.
60. See generally Marsehall, supra note 56.
61. "[Tlhere is no evidence that the ones who are mentally ill are any more danger-
ous than ones who are mentally healthy." Statement of Thomas Szasz in Hearings
on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 270 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings]. See also Swan, A New Emancipation: Toward
an End to Involuntary Civil Commitments, NoTRE DAME LAW. 1334, 1339 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Swan].
62. Predictability is the key word. Rather than lock up every person who is sus-
pected of being dangerous, it is necessary to make a psychiatric prediction of who ac-
tually is dangerous; thus the psychiatrists are placed in the position of having to pre-
dict the individual's future conduct.
63. U.S. CONsT. amends. V & XIV.
64. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1969).
65. Under the California scheme, the trier of fact may be either the judge or the
jury, depending on the type of hearing. See text accompanying notes 41, 52 supra.
66. See Murel v. Baltimore Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 359 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Statement of Bruce J. Ennis in Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 275 (1969-1970) [hereinafter cited as
1969-70 Hearings].
Professors Livermore, Malmquist, and Meehl present a statistical argument which
they claim demonstrates the inadequacies of any prediction technique, even one that
is highly accurate:
Assume that one person out of a thousand will kill. Assume that an exception-
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would be willing to admit, however, that a great many of those indi-
viduals committed on the basis of a psychiatric prediction of danger-
ally accurate test is created which differentiates with ninety-five percent effective-
ness those who will kill from those who will not. If 100,000 people were tested,
out of the 100 who would kill, 95 would be isolated. Unfortunately, out of the
99,900 who would not kill, 4,995 people would also be isoiated as potential kill-
ers. In these circumstances, it is clear that we could not justify incarcerating all
5,090 people. If, in the criminal law, it is better that ten guilty men go free than
that one innocent man suffer, how can we say in the civil commitment area that
it is better that fifty-four harmless people be incarcerated lest one dangerous man
be free?
Livermore, Malmquist, Meehl, Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
85, 94 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Livermore]. In People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319,
438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968), the California supreme court rejected the use
of mathematical probabilities to show the likelihood that a particular individual com-
mitted a particular crime. In doing so, the court, in an appendix to the opinion, con-
vincingly demonstrated the type of fallacy into which a person untrained in statistical
analysis can fall when attempting to use probability theory. Id. at 333-35. Prof.
Livermore's argument is one of the same fallacious mold as the court rejected in
Collins. As noted in Collins, "[m]athematics, a veritable sorcerer to our computerized
society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must not [be allowed to]
cast a spell over him." Id. at 320.
The prediction of the dangerousness of an individual is a problem in "detection
theory." In this discipline, the basic problem is as follows: A universe of "inputs"
is assumed, some of which are "signals" which carry desired information while others
are "noise" which carry no information. A combination of the signals and noise (nei-
ther of which are known to the observer) is "input" to a "detection device." The
device is supposed to indicate that a "signal" is present only when desired information
is in fact present at the input, and indicate no signal when only noise is present at
the input. Since all detection devices have some error in them, and since with purely
random noise, some noise will "look like" signal, the detection device will occasionally
output an erroneous indication. The measure of the performance of the device is then
based on the number of errors it makes. These can be of two types. First, the device
may not output an indication of signal when a signal is in fact present. The measure
of this kind of error is called the "probability of detection," or "P(D)." If the device
indicates the presence of a signal in 95% of the cases where a signal is actually present,
then the P(D) of that device is 95%. The other type of error occurs when the device
indicates the presence of a signal when in fact no signal is present. The measure
of this kind of error is called the "probability of false alarm," or "P(FA)." Thus,
if the system indicates the presence of signal in 5% of the cases where no such signal
is actually present, then the P(FA) of the system is 5%. The relation between these
two parameters is, in general, quite complicated, and depends on the signal character-
istics, the noise characteristics, the "strength" of the signal relative to the noise, and
the characteristics of the detection device itself. See generally, W. DAVENPORT & W.
RooT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY oF RANDOM SIGNALS AND NoisE (1958).
Applying this analysis to the problem set out by Livermore, et. al., the "universe
of inputs" includes all persons subjected to the test; "signal" are those persons who
will actually kill; "noise" consists of those persons who will not kill, and the "detection
device" is the psychiatrist who makes the prediction. Prof. Livermore's analysis then
assumes a P(D) of 95%, i.e., that 95% of all persons who are actually dangerous will
be so classified by the psychiatrist. His argument also assumes a P(FA) of 5%, i.e.,
that 5% of all persons who are not killers will be so classified. Prof. Livermore claims
that this is "an exceptionally accurate test." The difficulty with the argument lies in
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ousness are not actually dangerous,6 7 and, therefore, could not be in-
voluntarily confined if criminal law standards were applied.
the assumption that the relation between P(D) and P(FA) is:
P(FA) = 100% - P(D)
This assumption is completely unjustified both in logic and mathematics. Conceptually,
it would be possible to design a test which has a P(FA) of 0%o, i.e., it never mis-
classifies a non-killer, but which has a P(D) of 95%. Equally conceivable is a system
where P(D) = P(FA) = 95%. The point is that the accuracy of a test cannot be
determined only by reference to its P(D).
In designing any detection system, whether it be a psychiatric test or a radar re-
ceiver, the ultimate goal is to maximize the P(D) while minimizing the P(FA). But
in performing the inevitable "trade-off" between P(D) and P(FA), one must always
keep in mind which parameter is more important. In engineering terms, the para-
meters must be "weighted" according to their relative importance when doing the
trade-off. In the problem at hand, the emphasis should be, as it is in criminal law,
on minimizing the P(FA), even at the expense of lowering the P(D) below the ulti-
mate possible. (The importance of weighting the parameters properly can be shown
by the following example: Suppose that it is of overwhelming importance to incarcer-
ate all killers, and keeping non-killers free is of no importance. Then the obvious
solution is to lock up everyone, i.e., design a system with P(D) = P(FA) = 100%.)
When viewed in this light, Prof. Livermore's test, with its P(FA) of 5%, is an ex-
tremely poor detector-not the "exceptionally accurate" one he assumes it to be.
In terms of the result which is desired, a much more acceptable test would be, e.g.,
one which had a P(D) of 50%, or even 25%, and a P(FA) of 0.005%. But whatever
performance criteria are ultimately determined to be acceptable, it is clear that, at least
theoretically, a prediction system can be designed which meets those goals. In other
words, contrary to the implications of Prof. Livermore's argument, "prediction" does
not inherently mean that large numbers of innocent people must be locked up in order
to protect society from a large percentage of those who are dangerously ill.
67. See, e.g., Jessup, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 30 U. Prrr. L. REv.
752 (1969):
The Council of the American Psychiatric Association has approved the following
statement: "on the basis of long experience, psychiatrists estimate that about 90
percent of all mental hospital patients are harmless and in no way threaten the
community in which they reside." It has also been estimated that for every dan-
gerous mental patient there are one thousand perfectly harmless patients in insti-
tutions.
Id. at 765 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also 1961 Hearings, supra note 61,
pt. 1, at 43.
From the viewpoint of a psychiatric professional, the fact that most mental patients
are not really dangerous (even though most may have been committed under this criter-
ion) would not justify their release for two reasons: (1) If the individual were in
need of treatment, the standard used to bring the individual into a mental hospital
might not concern the psychiatrist; (2) A psychiatrist, primarily concerned with medi-
cal matters rather than civil liberties, might be inclined to keep an individual locked
up as long as any real possibility of dangerousness were present:
In the uncertain case, the doctor faces a dilemma. Aware of his own inability
to make accurate predictions, he may either be solicitous of individual freedom
and refuse to categorize the patient as dangerous, or he may be concerned more
with the protection of society and recommend commitment.
ArIZONA PxoiEcT, supra note 8, at 98. Basically one is faced with a conflict involving
essentially medical goals operating within the context of legal criteria. See notes 74-81
infra and accompanying text.
1974] CIVIL COMMITMENT
The difficulties with the "dangerousness" standard are threefold.
First, psychiatrists subject themselves to public censure if they release
patients who later prove to be actually dangerous. Professor Dersho-
witz 8 has written:
[A] psychiatrist almost never learns of his erroneous predictions of
violence. For predicted assailants are generally incarcerated and have
little opportunity to prove or disprove the prediction. But he always
learns about his erroneous predictions of non-violence, often from news-
paper headlines announcing the crime.6 9
(Of course, this statement is directed to the standards for release from
commitment, rather than the initial commitment itself, but the argu-
ment is still applicable in the latter case.) As a consequence, com-
mitting psychiatrists tend to overpredict dangerous behavior,70 and a
great many individuals are institutionalized on the basis of these erron-
eous predictions. 7'
68. See note 71 infra.
69. Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 23.
70. 'There is a natural inclination of institutional psychiatrists and committing
courts to protect themselves against possible censure by retaining patients until any
possibility of danger has passed." Livermore, supra note 66, at 85.
71. Psychiatric predictions of dangerous behavior are generally inaccurate. One
study by Professor Alan Dershowitz, of Harvard Law School, concluded:
Psychiatrists are rather inaccurate predictors-inaccurate in an absolute sense-
and even less accurate when compared with other professionals ... For every
correct psychiatric prediction of violence, there are only a few who would and
many more who would not actually engage in such conduct if released.
A. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment: A Knife that Cuts
Both Ways, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 43. Two specific case studies are
illustrative. A study of Maryland's Patuxent Institution for "defective delinquents"
shows that of 432 inmates who were released judicially over the objections of
the institution, only 137 (32%) committed new offenses. All of these patients
were considered dangerous by the hospital staff upon release. Yet 295 (68%)
of them showed no overt indication of dangerousness upon release. Schreiber, Inde-
terminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals: Perspectives and Prob-
lems, 56 VA. L. Rnv. 602, 619 (1970). One might be inclined to think that the release
of even 137 dangerous individuals out of 432 poses a threat to the community, and
indeed it does. But should this be a justification for the incarceration of all 432?
Note that these were all individuals who had previously committed some overt act
which could be classified as dangerous, but that in the case of civil commitments that
are independent of criminal proceedings, the individual frequently has committed no
prior dangerous or criminal act upon which the dangerousness prediction can be based.
The second case study involves the United States Supreme Court decision of Baxstrom
v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). In New York, convicts who become mentally ill while
serving in prison are transferred to Dannemora State Hospital, a maximum security
institution. If the patient is still considered mentally ill when the sentence expires,
he or she is transferred to the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene for placement in an
appropriate institution. If the ex-convict is still considered dangerous, he or she is
returned to a maximum security institution administered by the Department of Correc-
tion. See Morris, supra note 1, at 119; N.Y. CotREc. LAw § 383 (McKinney 1968),
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A second difficulty with the dangerousness criterion is its defini-
tional vagueness. This is, of course, closely intertwined with the diffi-
culty of prediction, but even if the predictions of the psychiatrists were
100 percent accurate, how dangerous would persons have to be?
N.Y. Laws ch. 540, § 4 (1965) (repealed N.Y. Laws ch. 891, § 1 (1966) ). Johnnie
K. Baxstrom was one such patient who was held in maximum confinement after the
expiration of his sentence. He sought a writ of habeas corpus and the Supreme Court,
with Chief Justice Warren writing for the majority, held that Baxstrom had been denied
equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment. The Court found that,
although the procedure in question was civil in nature, people in Baxstrom's position
were denied the possibility of jury review, a right granted to all other persons who
were civilly committed in New York. The Court also held that Baxstrom was entitled
to a judicial hearing to determine if he was dangerous. 383 U.S. at 110. As a result
of this decision "Operation Baxstrom" came into being. Nearly a thousand individ-
uals, all of whom were considered too dangerous to be released from maximum con-
finement, had to be transferred into minimum security civil state hospitals. Within
three months, 173 patients were retained as "voluntary" patients, meaning that
they could discharge themselves by giving ten days notice. Eighteen patients were
given "informal patient" status, meaning that they could leave the hospital at any time.
Only four of the original group of patients were transferred to maximum security in-
stitutions. After six months, it was found that only six-tenths of one percent of the
"Baxstrom" patients were too dangerous to be treated in civil hospitals. Morris, supra
note 1, at 118-24. Johnnie Baxstrom himself was transferred to a minimum security
hospital, and later a jury found that he was not mentally ill. He was released on
May 24, 1966. He died of an epileptic seizure on June 7, 1966. Id. at 120 n.51.
The report of the Department of Mental Hygiene after one year of "Operation Bax-
strom" stated: "The most striking news is that there is no news. None of the hos-
pitals has any particular problems to report." Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom
After One Year, 124 AM. J. PsYcHu.TRY 974, 976 (1968). Bruce Ennis, of the New
York Civil Liberties Union, concluded: "To use an analogy, the so-called dangerous
patients turned out to be purer than Ivory Snow. They were, in fact 99.54% non-dan-
gerous." B. ENNIS, THE RIGHTS OF AmmucANs 487 (1967).
The results of Operation Baxstrom and the Maryland experience prove that psy-
chiatric predictions of dangerous behavior are inaccurate in the direction of overpre.
diction of danger. Furthermore, other studies indicate that presently there are no
accurate tests to predict dangerous behavior. Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in
Civil Commitment: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1969, at
43, 47. On psychiatric predictions of danger, see generally ARIZONA PROJECT, supra
note 8, at 96-100.
This same inaccuracy exists when the psychiatrist is attempting to predict if in-
dividuals will be dangerous to themselves. In those jurisdictions where the standard of
dangerousness includes danger to self, such as California (see note 46 supra), suicidal
patients would naturally come under that criterion. Yet some maintain that such ir-
responsible behavior among mental patients is even more difficult to predict than is
behavior that would be dangerous to others. Livermore, supra note 66, at 86.
With respect to suicide specifically, not only are there no accurate tests for
predicting the likelihood of a given individual attempting it, but there is good reason
to believe that trying to assume responsibility for preserving the life of a suicidal per-
son may be the worst possible therapy. Protrowski, Psychological Test Prediction of
Suicide, SuicIDAL BEHAvroR 198 (1968). See also DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMIT-
MENTS, supra note 20, at 152-53.
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Would they have to be the type who inflicts pain for mere pleasure, or
would a short and violent temper suffice? Should a person who merely
threatens violence, but only on the most rare occasion actually indulges
in physical contact, be considered dangerous? Where, in other words,
is the line to be drawn between those who are "dangerous" in the sense
that they should be committed and those who are not? This question
apparently does not even appear as a problem to be resolved in the
literature on this subject,72 perhaps because it is one which is presently
beyond solution.73
A third difficulty with the dangerousness criterion is its basic irrele-
vance to any medical standard of mental illness. From a psychiatrist's
point of view, the only issue of consequence is whether or not the indi-
vidual is in need of treatment, the second of the common statutory com-
mitment standards.74 Yet even this purely medical standard can be as
vague and difficult to apply as the dangerousness criterion. Mental
72. See N. Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. Rv. 514
(1968). Writing in the context of criminal insanity, this article comes close to a
discussion of the question of where the cut-off should be before the label of "danger-
ous" is placed on an individual. Professor Morris writes:
Such an approach to predicting dangerousness does not, of course, define the
types of criminal behavior which are and are not "dangerous"--the types of risk
which the community should and should not have to bear. But adequate predic-
tion does lead us to the central policy issue after this definition: What degree of
risk should the community bear in relation to the countervailing values of individ-
ual freedom? That is, how many "false positive" predictions [one is predicted to be
a danger, but does not prove to be] are justified for the social benefits derived
from the "true positive" predictions? This is a socio-legal question, not within the
psychiatrists particular competence.
id. at 535-36.
73. Dangerousness, in light of the available empirical data (see note 71 supra) and
the definitional problem, might seem to be a constitutionally inadequate criterion when
used as a basis for civil commitment. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court,
in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940),
held that while due process of law is required in judicial proceedings that involve the
mentally ill, it is permissible to commit individuals because they are "dangerous" as
long as evidence of the individuals' habitual conduct is shown. Id. at 274-75. This
may be provided by the testimony of examining psychiatrists or by lay testimony. In
addressing the equal protection issue implicated by a process which singles out a par-
ticular group for possible incarceration unconnected with the commission of a crime,
the Court stated:
mhe legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine its re-
strictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. If the
law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown be-
cause there are other instances to which it might have been applied.
Id. at 275.
74. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
75. "The fact that competent psychiatrists disagree as to diagnostic labels ...does
raise questions as to the accuracy of predictability and assessment of results based in
part on these labels." Fuller, supra note 20, at 87. Some psychiatrists maintain
that, as difficult as mental illness is to define, they "know it when they see it." Id.
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health is defined in terms of a community norm,76 and, conversely,
those persons needing treatment are so categorized because they deviate
too greatly from the norm. By definition then, a determination that a
person is mentally ill is highly dependent on the community in which
the determination is made. In Salem, Massachusetts, during colonial
times, the burning of witches was considered "therapeutic"; it was good
therapy for the eternal souls of the "witches," and it was good therapy
for the community, which was able to purge itself of individuals who
did not conform to societal norms.77  Today, the concept of mental
illness, while more "scientific," is still defined in terms of norms, al-
though these norms are expressed in terms of psycho-social, ethical,
and legal concepts.78  Because such concepts are inherently vague, it
is difficult to identify which individuals should be institutionalized on
the basis of need for treatment, i.e., needing to be brought back to
some point reasonably close to the norm.79  The Senate Subcommit-
tee on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill heard testimony that a
number of studies show "psychiatric diagnosis. . . so unreliable as to
merit very serious question when classifying, treating, and studying
patient behavior and outcome.
80
While part of the problem with the concept "need for treatmenf' thus
lies in the absence of an objective definition of mental illness,81 part lies
in the considerable fragmentation within the psychiatric community
at 87 n.49. Compare Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
76. See Wegner & Fletcher, supra note 10, at 67 ("Mental illness is not a fact in the
same sense as a broken leg: ...It is a legal theory to explain deviant behavior.");
1969-70 Hearings, supra note 66, at 419 ('The great bulk of mental illness is defined
and measured in terms of behavioral deviance."); Duhl, The Changing Face of
Mental Health, THE URBAN CONDiION 59, 63 (L. Duhl ed. 1963) ("Mhe concept of
normality has become the criterion of mental health. But since the middle class
is most often the source of what is considered 'normal,' we are in peril of utiliz-
ing 'mental health' to perpetuate middle-class values."); Szasz, Involuntary Com-
mitment: A Form of Slavery, Tm HuMANIST, July-Aug. 1971 at 12 [hereinafter cited
as A Form of Slavery] ("Mental illness is a metaphor. If by disease we mean a dis-
order of the physiochemical machinery of the body, then we can assert that what we
call 'functional mental diseases' are not diseases at all. Persons said to be suffering
from such disorders are socially deviant or inept, or in conflict with individuals,
groups, or institutions. Since they do not suffer from disease, it is impossible to 'treat'
them for any sickness.").
77. See generally A. MILLER, TiE CRUCrBLE (1952).
78. LEwER, Socl PROBLEMS 22 (1966); SzAsz, supra note 2, at 14.
79. See generally Wenger & Fletcher, supra note 10.
80. 1969-70 Hearings, supra note 66, at 420, quoting CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
REsPoNsivE LAw, TowARDs AN ENLiGHTENED COMMrrMENT LAw (1970).
81. See SzAsz, supra note 2, at 99-100.
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regarding the application of whatever criteria the profession should
decide to follow."' The entire diagnostic process allows the exam-
ining doctor to view the patient in almost any light desired.8 If the
physician is so predisposed, he or she has the ability to "shoehorn"
almost anyone into the "mentally ill" classification for almost any rea-
son. 14 The fate of the patient is thus almost entirely dependent on
the personal views of the diagnostician as to how to interpret and
apply the various psychiatric criteria.8 5
As vague as the criteria for civil commitment may seem to be
in reality, when they are placed in the context of the commitment hear-
ing, they may appear perfectly definite to the committing court. This
is due to a breakdown in communication between the legal and medical
professions."6 The physician may recognize the limits of the diagnosis
and predictions, but is forced by statute to place the patient in cate-
gories which the physician may feel are entirely unsatisfactory. 7  From
the point of view of the court, however, once a person is so categorized,
a definite and meaningful result has been reached, and the court feels
82. T. CANE & J. SMAiE, THE TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS 7 (1969). As-
suming that a behavioral norm of some sort could be established, the professionals
still disagree as to the use of therapeutic techniques. Cf. Mechanic, Therapeutic Inter-
vention: Issues in the Care of the Mentally Ill, AM. J. ORTHopSYCMATRY, July 1967,
at 703; Schatzman & Strauss, A Sociology of Psychiatry: A Perspective and Some
Organizing Foci, SocAL PROBLEMS, Summer 1966, at 7. In addition, none of the
techniques used have enough evidential support to justify any assertions about
their effectiveness. Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment,
77 YALE L.. 87, 105 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Civil Restraint]. One comparison
of diagnoses among eight residents of the same psychiatric institution showed an over-
all percentage of agreement of only 42%. Beck, Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses:
1. A Critique of Systematic Studies, AM. J. PSYCHATRY, Sept. 1962, at 210, 212.
The number of categories and subcategories of mental disorders that are listed in psy-
chiatric manuals are numerous enough to include almost any type of personality in
the insanity class. Note, The Need for Reform in the California Civil Commitment
Procedure, 19 STAN. L. REv. 992, 999 (1967). The American Psychiatric Associa-
tion's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1952) lists four-
teen different categories and within these over 75 subcategories of mental disorders.
83. Livermore, supra note 66, at 80.
84. Id.
85. See Manis, The Sociology of Knowledge and Community Mental Health Research,
15 SocIAL PROBLEMS 498 (1968); JONrr INFORMATION SmvwicE OF THE A~mcA,
PsYcHIATRIc ASSOCIATION AN TE NATIONAL ASsOCIATION OF MENTAL HEALTH, STUDY,
(Nov. 1962).
86. "When we try to answer the court's questions we implicitly assent to their va-
lidity. We thereby reinforce the confusion of the judge, jury and public, while per-
petuating an absurd dilemma for the legal system and forensic psychiatrist." Dr.
Kaufman, Adjunct Professor of Law and Psychiatry, Georgetown Law Center, in
1969-70 Hearings, supra note 66, at 401.
87. Interview, supra note 45.
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it can proceed on firm ground. It thus appears that the two professions
may be operating under two different standards, using the same terms
to convey each profession's distinct meaning.
The California statutory commitment scheme appears to set forth
a more specific standard for who may be committed than the laws of
most jurisdictions.8 8  Persons who are classified simply as "mentally
disordered" may no longer be involuntarily hospitalized under the pro-
visions of LPS.89 Individuals who are considered dangerous to them-
selves or to others, however, and persons defined as "gravely disabled"
may still be taken into custody if "reasonable cause" is shown. 0 The
Act does not define the terms "dangerous," "mentally disordered," or
"reasonable cause," 91 although it does define "gravely disabled" as
"a condition in which a person, as a result of mental disorder, is
unable to provide for his basic personal needs for food, clothing, or
shelter." 92 Further, the California State Department of Health has, by
regulation, adopted the American Psychiatric Association's definitions
of "mental disorder."
93
Since the "gravely disabled" standard has not yet been litigated at the
appellate level, it is difficult to predict how narrowly or broadly the
courts will interpret it. On its face, the statutory definition seems
clear and comparatively easy to apply. It may even be that it can be
applied by lay triers of fact without the intervention of psychiatric
testimony. On the other hand, it is possible that the term could be
interpreted to be a "need for treatment" standard. Apparently some
psychiatrists have so interpreted the statute, although the indications
are that this has happened only in limited areas on an occasional
basis.94
Similarly, the meaning of "reasonable cause" has not been litigated
at the appellate level, and there is a dearth of information concerning
88. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5150 (West 1972). Included within LPS
are new time limits and commitment procedures for the hospitalization of mentally
ill individuals, a "Bill of Rights" for the patient in the hospital, and a conservatorship
program for those who are gravely disabled. See notes 24-54 supra and accompanying
text.
89. Id. § 5002.
90. Id. § 5150. See ENKI REPORT, supra note 20, at 12-13. Most of the residents
of California's mental hospitals at the time of the adoption of LPS were not "dangerous
to others."
91. See Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 669, 464 P.2d 56, 58, 83 Cal. Rptr.
600, 602 (1970).
92. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5008(h) (West 1972).
93. 9 CAL. AD. CODE § 813.
94. See ENKI REPORT, supra note 20, at 158.
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the standards actually employed. Hopefully, the courts will interpret
the phrase to contain the same meaning as "probable cause" in the
criminal law context. It would seem that any other standard would be
subject to attack on the ground that the person being committed was
being deprived of liberty without due process of law.
The most difficult standard to apply is "dangerousness." Much has
been written on this subject,95 but the legislature carefully avoided de-
fining it in LPS. There are some indications that this was done in
order to allow some flexibility in the commitment standards, 96 but in
practice, "dangerousness" has been interpreted in a very narrow and
strict manner. The ENKI Report97 states that some people associated
with LPS claim that before a person's detention can be continued on
the basis that the person is a danger to others, not only must the pa-
tient commit a specific overt act toward someone, but that act must
be witnessed by either a psychiatrist or a police officer.98 Such an in-
terpretation is surely not required by the language of the statute. Ac-
cording to the District Attorney's office in Los Angeles, which acts as a
"prosecutor" in civil commitment hearings in Los Angeles, the criterion
used for the initial detention is not quite so strictly interpreted, and
a person can be committed without the necessity of showing a specific
example of dangerous behavior. 99 Nevertheless, fewer persons are being
committed,100 and they have been committed under standards which
from the available data, seem more closely to satisfy due process re-
quirements than those used in the past.101 Furthermore, this result has
apparently been accomplished without increasing the public's exposure
to dangerous behavior on the part of mentally disordered persons.02
Thus, in terms of protection of civil liberties, it would appear that
LPS's approach to the "dangerousness" problem has been fairly success-
ful.
But improvements are needed. While the California courts have
been interpreting the dangerousness criterion strictly, it appears that
psychiatrists themselves have not changed their basic approach to com-
95. See notes 59-76 supra.
96. See ENKI REPORT, supra note 20, at 154.
97. ENKI REPORT, supra note 20.
98. Id. at 155.
99. Interview with Mel Thale, Head of the Psychiatric Division, District Attorney's
Office, Los Angeles County, Nov. 2, 1973.
100. Interview, supra note 45,
101. The standards on their face appear vague; as applied, they seem to be satisfac-
tory.
102. ENKI REPORT, supra note 20, at 155.
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mitment. 103  This places a considerable burden on the courts, since
the psychiatrist, who is still the primary witness at commitment pro-
ceedings, is still basing the prediction of dangerousness on poorly
defined, subjective criteria which apparently correlate only with the
psychiatrist's feeling that the person needs custodial treatment.10 4  The
court must then rely on the testimony of someone who is speaking a
different language than that used by the court, even though the words
employed may sound the same.10 5 It is doubtful that changes in the
statutory criteria will solve this problem, however, since any standard
adopted can be subverted in the same way as the present dangerousness
standard. °06
B. The Right to Treatment
For many years state hospitals have been dumping grounds for in-
dividuals who are unwanted or undesirable, 07 with hospitalization
amounting to little more than another form of incarceration. 08  When
persons are found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity,1 9 such
incarceration seems almost paradoxical: They cannot be imprisoned,
for they are not guilty, but they are deprived of liberty for no other rea-
son than their undesirable nature." 0 The contrast is even more stark
in civil commitments: Individuals are "dumped" into a "hospital" where
they receive no treatment even though they, unlike acquitted criminal
defendants, have committed no act which society deems worthy of the
label of "crime."
In 1966, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
umbia became the first court to accept the principle of a "right to treat-
ment" for individuals involuntarily detained in mental institutions. In
103. Id. at 116.
104. See notes 71-84 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 71-84 supra.
106. The solution probably lies in clearly defining the role of the lawyer in civil
commitment proceedings. See notes 258-60 infra and accompanying text. And, of
course, the mere adoption of certain standards by the legislature cannot change the
medical standards by which a psychiatrist will personally determine whether or not
a person should be hospitalized.
107. See Fuller, supra note 20, at 75.
108. "[A]n institution that involuntarily institutionalizes the mentally ill without
giving them adequate medical treatment for their mental illness is a mental prison
and not a mental hospital." Statement of Morton Birnbaum in 1969-70 Hearings,
supra note 66, at 363. See also Marschall, supra note 56, at 39.
109. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1972).
110. See Abramson, supra note 15, at 103; Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 452
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Rouse v. Cameron,111 Chief Judge David Bazelon, writing for the ma-
jority, held that the purpose of such hospitalization is to provide treat-
ment, not punishment,:" 2 and that a mental patient who is not receiving
treatment may obtain habeas corpus relief."13 The supposition which
runs throughout the Rouse decision is that individuals are committed
because they are in need of treatment," 4 and, as Judge Bazelon has
noted elsewhere, "If society confines a man for the benevolent pur-
pose of helping him-'for his own good'- . . . then its right to so
withhold his freedom depends entirely upon whether help is in fact
provided.""' 5
Despite this rather appealing statement, the impact of Rouse is severely
curtailed by the qualification that the treatment need not be effective.
That is, the hospital is not required to show that the treatment will cure
the patient, but only that "there is a bona fide effort to do so.""' In
Tribby v. Cameron,"17 the same court that decided Rouse held that
the psychiatrist's decision as to the type of treatment to be given is sub-
ject to judicial review, but that the court's role is similar to that it plays
when reviewing the decisions of administrative agencies.." 8  There-
fore, the court is limited to determining if the psychiatrist's decisions
are "permissible and reasonable in view of the relevant information and
within a broad range of discretion.""' 9
This case is indicative of the reluctance of many jurists to carefully
scrutinize psychiatric decisions. Another example is Chief Justice (then
111. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
112. Id. at 452. The right to treatment in Rouse was justified in terms of statu-
tory language, but the court also stated: "Absence of treatment 'might draw into ques-
tion the constitutionality of [this] mandatory commitment section' as applied." Id.
at 453. For a discussion of the constitutional arguments, see Civil Restraint, supra
note 82, at 97-104. See also Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp.,
233 N.E.2d 908, 913 (Mass. 1968), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
based the right to treatment on due process and equal protection grounds.
113. 373 F.2d at 458. It should be noted that Rouse and many of the other cases
in this area involve persons criminally committed to mental institutions. As has been
noted, however, (see note 57 supra) the "right to treatment" doctrine is applicable
irrespective of the initial reason for commitment. Therefore, the rationale of these
cases is applicable to both civil and criminal commitment situations.
114. "The purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment .... Absent treat-
ment the hospital is transformed .. .into a penitentiary where one could be held in-
definitely." Id. at 452-53.
115. Bazelon, supra note 20, at 102.
116. 373 F.2d at 456.
117. 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
118. Id. at 105.
119. Id.
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Judge) Burger's concurring opinion in Dobson v. Cameron,1 21 where
he stated that he had "grave doubts that we are qualified to oversee
mental hospitals in cases of civil commitment."'1 21  He viewed the role
the court should play as being "largely limited to determining whether
the choice of therapy was a conscious medical decision rather than
neglect; obviously judges have no competence to evaluate the quality
of a given choice of treatment.' 12  Superficially this argument might
seem to have some validity, but when one considers the role the
courts play in medical malpractice cases, it becomes difficult to de-
fend. In such cases, the courts not only are called on to determine
if the particular choice of treatment was correct, but whether the
initial diagnosis was correct and whether the treatment given, even
if correct, was properly executed.'12  If courts are qualified to oversee
physical medicine to this degree, certainly they must also be qualified
to oversee the treatment given to mental patients. Nonetheless, Chief
Justice Burger's comments are by no means unique and are an indi-
cation of the extent to which the courts have abdicated their respon-
sibilities to the psychiatric profession.1
2 4
Other courts, while affirming the right to treatment concept, have
greatly diluted its utility by predicating its application on other criteria,
including the availability of staff and the protection of the community
(a semantic variation of the dangerousness standard).125  This con-
forms to the attitude taken toward the right to treatment approach by
many within the psychiatric field. When the Rouse decision was handed
down, the Council of the American Psychiatric Association responded
by stating:
It is the responsibility of the physician to determine the appropriate
treatment techniques. . . . Further, this determination must be made
realistically in relation to the facilities, personnel, and objectives of the
institutions, clinics, or agencies that are at hand.'
2 6
120. 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
121. Id. at 523.
122. Id. at 524 n.2.
123. See, e.g., Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969)
(reversing nonsuit in malpractice action based on theory that a myelogram had been
negligently performed).
124. See notes 196-99 infra and accompanying text. A classic example of such
abdication is found in Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335
(N.D. Ga. 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-3110, 5th Cir., Oct. 4, 1972.
125. Some states have adopted the Draft Act Governing the Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill (Public Health Service Publication No. 51, Sept. 1962) which states:
"Every patient shall be entitled to humane care and treatment . . . to the extent that
facilities, equipment, and personnel are available." Id. at 19.
126. 123 AM. J. PsYcsATRY 1458, 1459 (1967). But see Wyatt v. Stickney, 344
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Another difficulty is that the criteria established in the right to treat-
ment doctrine, as it has been applied in the Tribby and Dobson deci-
sions, are sufficiently vague as to allow the courts to take as active or as
passive a role as they wish in the supervision of the treatment of mental
patients. 127  For this reason, the doctrine has been dismissed as "an
enchanting legal fiction."'128
To some extent, the discussion of treatment and involuntary hospital-
ization in the same context is internally inconsistent. One of the con-
clusions arrived at by many psychiatrists is that the coercion inherent
in the civil commitment process has a negative effect on mental pa-
tients'29 in that involuntary institutionalization not only fails to help
many individuals, but, in some cases, exacerbates the patient's illness. 130
Dr. Werner M. Mendel, of the University of Southern California School
of Medicine, after studying nearly 3,000 schizophrenic patients, con-
cluded:
F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforcing
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), appeal docketed sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
No. 72-2634, 5th Cir., Aug. 1, 1972, noted in 86 HARV. L. REV. 1282 (1973), in which
the court ordered that the Alabama Mental Health Board implement minimal treatment
standards designed to give mental patients a "realistic opportunity" to improve or be
cured.
127. See Katz, supra note 9, at 32-34.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Some claim that the principal motivating factor underlying the reactions of
mental hospital staffs is fear of patients. This leads them to adopt policies aimed
at custody, rather than therapy. RuBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL LAW 83 (1965).
In Ward 7, Valeriy Tarsis presents this statement by a patient to a hospital physician:
"This is the position. I don't regard you as a doctor. You call this a hospital, I
call it a prison. . . . I am your prisoner, you are my jailer, and there isn't going
to be any nonsense about my health.., or treatment." Quoted in, A Form of Slavery,
supra note 76, at 13.
130. Dr. Philip Deutsch testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights that "freedom is a therapeutic tool" when dealing with mentally ill individuals.
1961 Hearings, supra note 61, at 45. This theory was empirically supported by a study
of 7,000 mental cases in the 1950's. The subjects were divided into two equal groups.
One group received treatment in a mental hospital, while the other group did not re-
ceive any treatment at all. A greater number of the group not treated recovered
sooner, apparently spontaneously. Kimmel, Patterns and Consequences of Psychiatric
Hospital Treatment, 21 BROOKLYN BARIsTER 186, 190 (1970).
One tends to wonder about a system of treatment where the patients improve faster
when they are left untreated. Dr. Szasz sums up the loss of liberty experienced by
the mental patient:
A psychiatrist who accepts as his "client" a person who does not wish to be his
client, defines him as a "mentally ill" person, then incarcerates him in an institu-
tion, bars his escape from the institution and from the role of mental patient, and
proceeds to "treat" him against his will-such a psychiatrist, I maintain, creates
"mental illness" and "mental patients."
A Form of Slavery, supra note 76, at 14.
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"The chronic, deteriorated schizophrenic patient who vegetates in
the back wards of our many state hospitals is the final outcome of an
iatrogenic (doctor caused) condition resulting from long hospitalization
superimposed on the schizophrenic illness.'' 31
It may be that the loss of liberty is itself counter-therapeutic.18 2 Data
is, as yet, inconclusive, but there is evidence to suggest that patients
who are not hospitalized recover more rapidly than those who are hos-
pitalized, even though the non-hospitalized individuals receive no
treatment at all and would have been classified in the same category
of mental illness as those who were confined. 88
These types of problems led Judge Bazelon, commenting on his own
right to treatment doctrine, to admit the possibility that the Rouse deci-
sion may have created an unenforceable right:
If psychiatric standards for adequate treatment are uncertain among
experts and incomprehensible to mere judges, then perhaps we must
admit, however reluctantly, that Rouse discovered the fabled right
without a remedy.'3 4
Yet, Judge Bazelon did find hope in the California statutory scheme:
"If its [LPS] goals are achieved, the necessity for a right to treatment
in its present form will wither away."' 8
To the extent that LPS allows greater freedom of choice for the civ-
My committed individual, it would appear to remove the impairment
to adequate treatment caused by the coercion inherent in most invol-
untary civil commitment procedures.' 8 6 In addition, a form of the
right to treatment doctrine is written into the legislation. LPS requires
that incarcerated patients receive "such treatment and care" as their
condition requires during the period of confinement. 17 The overall
legislative scheme, as indicated in the section on intent, is designed to
provide the best possible atmosphere for the patient within the confines
of the institution.'38 For example, the patient is given a choice of
physician within the limits of available staff, 39 and the bill establishes
the legislative intent that mentally and physically handicapped persons
131. Projects, supra note 12, at 862 n.216, quoting unpublished paper on file at
the University of Southern California School of Medicine.
132. See'note 130 supra.
133. See note 130 supra; FRAZiER & CARR, INToDUCUON TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 124
(1964).
134. Bazelon, supra note 20, at 96.
135. Id. at 108.
136. See notes 129-33 supra and accompanying text.
137. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5152 (West 1972).
138. Id. § 5001.
139. Id. § 5009. According to Dr. Victor Haddox (see note 45 supra), the practi-
cal realities of mental hospital administration prevent any patient from actually exer-
cising the choice given him by this section.
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should be allowed to live in "normal residential surroundings" where
possible. 140  Even the patient's religious inclinations are provided for in
a section allowing treatment by prayer. 141
To some extent, however, the enactment of LPS has worked against
the concept of the right to treatment. The community has, in the past,
tended to view civil commitment as a means of social control.14  LPS,
with its emphasis on early release of committed individuals, runs
counter to this attitude,143 with the result that criminalization of the
mentally ill seems to be more common than it was in the pre-LPS
period.'4
Quite often candidates for civil commitment enter the system follow-
ing an arrest for such offenses as public drunkenness, malicious mis-
chief, or possession of drugs.' 45 Criminal charges are dropped in favor
of commitment to a mental institution, which is generally considered
better for the individual who will then be able to receive treatment not
always available in state prisons. 146  Under LPS, with its more strin-
gent limitations on confinement, the criminal justice system has gone
searching for a better way to insure that these individuals will remain
in custody.' 47 The result is that, in many cases, the criminal conviction
is replacing hospitalization for mentally ill individuals.' 48  Marc Ab-
ramson, a psychiatric consultant to the San Mateo County, California
jail system, observes:
Police seem to be aware of the more stringent criteria under which
mental health professionals are now accepting responsibility for invol-
untary detention and treatment, and thus regard arrest and booking
into jail as a more reliable way of securing involuntary detention of
mentally disordered persons.' 49
140. CAL. WELF. & INSfNS CODE ANN. § 5115 (West 1972).
141. The provisions of this .part shall not be construed to deny treatment by spiri-
tual means through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recog-
nized church or denomination for any person detained for evaluation or treatment
who desires such treatment, or to a minor if his parent, guardian, or conservator
desires such treatment.
Id. § 5006.
142. See Abramson, supra note 15, at 102; Fuller, supra note 20, at 80-81.
143. But see Fuller, supra note 20, at 80-81.
144. Abramson, supra note 15, at 103.
145. Id.
146. Id. There is only one psychiatrist per 2,000 to 3,000 federal prisoners and one
for every 12,000 state prisoners. 1969-70 Hearings, supra note 66, at 562. One
authority, however, contends that some California prisons have better care available
for the treatment of mentally ill persons than the mental hospitals. Interview, supra
note 45.
147. Abramson, supra note 15, at 103.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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Because of the exclusions in LPS, long-term commitment is still pos-
sible if the person is found to be a user of hard drugs or to be a men-
tally disordered sex offender.'50 In hearings to determine the compe-
tence of an individual to stand trial, the standards (non-LPS) are such
that the psychiatrist may be able to base the decision concerning the
person's competence on a "need for treatment" standard without the
necessity for showing either dangerousness or grave disability in the
LPS sense. 15' Since these standards have been rigorously applied in
civil proceedings, psychiatrists will find that they have more "success,"
i.e., more of the persons they feel need treatment will be committed,
under the criminal standards than the civil.' 52 Thus, the correctional
system, which in general offers little in the way of rehabilitative ser-
vices for the mentally ill, 158 becomes an alternate form of social control
which results in the person being unable to obtain the type of treat-
ment guaranteed by LPS.
C. Release From Hospitalization
The writ of habeas corpus is considered a writ of right and is con-
stitutionally guaranteed in our legal system.' 54 Nevertheless, the avail-
ability of the remedy does not necessarily solve the problem of gaining
release for a mental patient who may no longer be in need of confine-
150. California statutes still permit long-term civil commitment for users of hard
narcotics; however, this procedure is usually invoked only after criminal convic-
tion, prior to sentencing. Abusers of habit-forming nonnarcotic drugs are no
longer vulnerable since provision for their civil commitment was repealed about
one year after LPS went into effect.
The only completely indeterminate commitments still existing in California are
those for mentally disordered sex offenders (again applicable only after criminal
conviction), and penal-code commitments that follow adjudication of mental
incompetency to stand trial or of being not guilty by reason of insanity.
Id. It should be noted that some psychiatrists strongly disagree with this statement, cit-
ing the statutory requirements and case law interpreting those requirements. Interview,
supra note 45.
151. Raising the question of mental incompetency to stand trial sometimes permits
psychiatric examiners to reintroduce covertly the old need-for-hospitalization cri-
terion to secure involuntary treatment of the mentally disordered person for an
adequate length of time, beyond the LPS time limits.
Abramson, supra note 15, at 103.
152. Id. at 104.
153. A California prison psychiatrist said in a recent newspaper interview, "We
are literally drowning in patients, running around trying to put our fingers in
the bursting dikes, while hundreds of men continue to deteriorate psychiatrically
before our eyes into serious psychoses .... The crisis stems from recent
changes in the mental health laws allowing more mentally sick patients to be
shifted away from the mental health department into the department of correc-
tions .... Many more men are being sent to prison who have serious mental
problems."
Id., quoting Sacramento Bee, Feb. 13, 1971, at A4.
154. U.S. CousT. art. I, § 9; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963).
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ment. When patients wish to challenge their continued detention
through this writ, it is their burden to persuade the court that they are
sane or will pose no more threat to the community than the average per-
son.' 55 In Overholser v. O'Beirne,'5" a criminal commitment case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
patients must demonstrate that they are so recovered that there no long-
er exists an abnormal mental condition.157  As a result of this type of
decision, it is difficult for mental patients in some jurisdictions to avail
themselves of habeas corpus.
The first problem facing patients seeking release in habeas corpus
proceedings is the difficult level of proof required to demonstrate im-
proper detention.15 8 This becomes especially difficult if the commit-
ment order conforms with all the procedural requirements. As Dr.
Thomas Szasz, Professor of Psychiatry at the State University of New
York, indicates, "[l]f the commitment forms are properly executed,
the plaintiff has no valid claim."' 59
Since courts usually follow the recommendation of the psychiatrist,
the decision to release a mental patient was,160 prior to LPS, almost
exclusively in the hands of the hospital. staff. 6' From the doctor's
point of view, the mere fact that the patient seeks release may be evi-
dence that the patient is in need of further hospitalization.' After
all, recognition that one is sick is a necessary step toward recovery.
That is the "Catch 22T"z63 of involuntary hospitalization. Commitment
thus becomes, for some, tantamount to a life sentence.' Even for
155. See, e.g., In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 852, 372 P.2d 304, 306, 22 Cal. Rptr.
472, 474 (1962).
156. 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
157. Id. See also SzAsz, supra note 2, at 67.
158. This is, of course, the burden placed on any petitioner seeking a writ of habeas
corpus. See note 155 supra. Dr. Haddox (see note 45 supra) indicates, however, that
in his experience the state seems to assume the actual burden in habeas corpus hearings
under LPS. The statute itself is silent on the question.
159. SzAsz, supra note 2, at 65.
160. Id. at 69.
161. See notes 193-219 infra and accompanying text.
162. Swan, supra note 61, at 1343; SzAsz, supra note 2, at 63.
163. There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a con-
cern for one's own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was
the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he
had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would
have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if
he didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy
and didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian
was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let
out a respectful whistle.
1. HELLER, CATcH-22, at 47 (1961).
164. See Statement of Raymond Chasen in 1961 Hearings, supra note 61, at 220-21.
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rational individuals, clearly no longer in need of confinement, the strug-
gle to gain release can take years.'0 5  Patients may vegetate for years
in hospital wards before being able to secure legal assistance. 16
Under the provisions of LPS, an attempt is made to correct this sit-
uation by placing the right to habeas corpus relief into the legislative
scheme. 167  The patient, however, may not be able to make effective
use of this writ if he or she does not make a formal request for re-
lease.16 A question immediately arises as to what constitutes a request
for release. It would seem that, by definition, the very fact that a per-
son is confined involuntarily demonstrates a lack of consent to treat-
ment. Is such lack of consent a request for release? Likewise,
would other conduct, such as an escape attempt, constitute a request for
release? The California supreme court, in Thorn v. Superior Court,'
raised these questions but provided no answer. 70  The Thorn court
did decide, however, that procedures must be provided so that a
patient who does not specifically request release may invoke the judi-
cial machinery that LPS has created to review the legality of continued
detention.' 7 ' Accordingly, it is necessary to insure that every indi-
vidual has counsel to provide proper assistance in obtaining habeas
corpus relief.' 72  No mandatory procedures for invoking the legal
process were established in the Thorn decision.178
The habeas corpus provisions were treated more directly in In re
Gonzales.7 4 There the court denied a writ of habeas corpus to an
individual who was committed prior to enactment of LPS17 and sug-
gested instead that the petitioner be accorded the benefits of a conserva-
torship.176  If no conservatorship petition had been filed for him by a
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 5252.1, 5275. Prior to the enactment
of LPS, the writ was seldom used by committed individuals, although it was theoreti-
cally available. ENKI REPORT, supra note 20, at 179.
168. See generally Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 675, 464 P.2d 56, 62,
83 Cal. Rptr. 600, 606 (1970).
169. 1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970).
170. Id. at 675 n.9, 464 P.2d at 62 n.9, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.9.
171. The court did suggest some possible procedures. Id. at 675, 464 P.2d at 62,
83 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
172. Id.
173. See note 171 supra.
174. 6 Cal. 3d 346, 491 P.2d 809, 99 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1971).
175. Id. at 347, 491 P.2d at 809, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
176. Id. at 351, 491 P.2d at 812-13, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
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specified date, he could again seek relief by habeas corpus. 1'7 7  Ex-
pressing the unanimous view of the court, Justice Burke stated:
We are persuaded that the Legislature intended that one committed as
dangerously mentally ill under former section 5567, as was petitioner,
should neither be automatically released under provisions of the new
LPS act, nor should he be deprived of the medication he needs to con-
trol his violence, in order to provide a basis for continued detention
for his own safety and that of the public. Instead, he is to be ac-
corded the benefits of the conservatorship proceedings under the new
act.178
This approach might indicate more than a reluctance to apply auto-
matic release procedures to persons committed before LPS; it can also
be interpreted as showing that the attitude of the California judiciary
toward habeas corpus relief for mentally ill individuals is similar to that
of other jurisdictions, i.e., that a considerable burden will still be placed
on the individual seeking release to show that he or she is no longer in
need of confinement.' Such an interpretation of this decision is ques-
tionable, however, because of the unusual factual situation presented by
the case. Gonzales' psychiatrist characterized him as "one of the most
dangerous men I have ever examined."'180 The patient was contin-
ually kept under heavy sedation, since when he was not drugged he
was extremely violent.""' The psychiatrist in charge of his case was
thus faced with a perplexing dilemma. In order to keep Gonzales con-
fined as being a "danger to others," the doctor had to be able to re-
port to the court every ninety days that the patient had at least threatened
violence to someone in the hospital. To have such a threat materialize,
the doctor would have had to take Gonzales off the calming drugs, but
if this course of action were to be followed, the patient could seriously
injure someone on the staff. On the other hand, the doctor could keep
the patient on drugs for the entire ninety days, during which time the
patient would not, of course, commit any violent acts. At the end of the
ninety day period, the doctor would have to release Gonzales knowing
that he would injure someone on the outside within a few days. 82 The
177. id.
178. Id. The conservatorship in Gonzales was available under the terms of CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5367 (West 1972) which states that such conservator-
ships are available to persons committed prior to the effective date of the Act. The
section is not limited in its operation to those who were committed as being what
LPS would call "gravely disabled."
179. See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
180. 6 Cal. 3d at 350, 491 P.2d at 812, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 350 n.9, 491 P.2d at 812 n.9, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 20 n.9.
19.74]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
case vividly demonstrates the inadequacies of the definitional standards
set up by the LPS.' It also indicates one reason psychiatrists might
tend to make overly cautious predictions of future violence by their
patients.' 84 And, of course, the factual situation in Gonzales destroys
any value the case might have in predicting the future course of ju-
dicial decisions under LPS: The court was clearly concerned with
keeping such a dangerous individual calmly and safely sedated within the
confines of an institution.
The experience in the superior courts indicates that habeas corpus
petitions are in fact an effective means by which an individual may se-
cure release. According to Dr. Victor Haddox, approximately 90
percent of such petitions result in the release of the patient;' 85 the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's office estimates that approximately
75 percent of all petitions result in release.'80 If these figures are re-
flective of the state as a whole, it would appear that the inclusion of
the right to habeas corpus within the commitment statute itself has
indeed produced a prophylactic effect on the patient's ability to obtain
release.18
7
Outside the possibility of habeas corpus, LPS attempted to assure
as early a release from hospitalization as possible by placing finite
limits on the duration of permissible detention.'88 The critics of the
bill argued that such limits would have a negative effect on the pa-
tients, 8 9 but those whose major concern was the rights of the individual
felt that such a requirement was necessary to protect those rights.' 0
The ENKI Report indicates, however, that in practice, the limits have
had essentially no effect on the average duration of detention.101
Therefore, it appears that the major impact of LPS has been through
the habeas corpus proceedings and not because of the limited periods
of commitment specified in the Act. 92
183. See text accompanying notes 55-102 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
185. See note 45 supra.
186. See note 99 supra.
187. The ENKI REPORT, supra note 20, indicates that the usefulness of habeas
corpus might be dependent on the county in which the patient is committed. Id. at
179-83.
188. See text accompanying notes 35-39, 42-46, 51-52 supra.
189. See ENKI REPORT, supra note 20, at 142.
190. See generally Bazelon, supra note 20.
191. ENKI REPORT, supra note 20, at 142.
192. In terms of the number of patients in mental facilities, however, the strict
interpretation the courts have given the dangerousness criteria has probably had a
larger impact. See note 10) supra and accompanying text.
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D. Role of the Psychiatrist
As previously noted, some psychiatrists believe that incarceration
of the mentally ill is entirely a medical problem,193 and that they
should have unrestricted power to commit. 94 As a result, psychia-
trists do not generally regard the commitment hearing as a true adver-
sary proceeding but rather as a judicial certification of a previously
made medical judgment.'95
The courts have acquiesced in the psychiatrists' approach: Several
studies outside of California show that the recommendation of the com-
mitting physician is adopted in a very large majority of the cases.' 96
The psychiatrist thus assumes the role of an "unimpeachable witness,"' 97
whose conclusions are seldom questioned, and even less often re-
jected. 19  The psychiatrist has therefore become the most signifi-
cant participant in the commitment hearings, with the courts sitting
merely to review, then ratify, psychiatric decisions. 99
Under the California statute, it is the psychiatrist who is primarily
responsible for advocating the confinement of the mentally ill individ-
ual.200 The responsibility to petition the court for continued confine-
ment lies with the person in charge of the mental health facility where
the patient is confined, although admittedly this is not the exclu-
sive responsibility of this individual. 201 Furthermore, the basic role
of the physician in the commitment hearing has not been changed by
LPS. The physician now has different terms to use when classifying the
193. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra. Some psychiatrists do prefer volun-
tary admissions over the involuntary procedure, but others appear to be indifferent as
long as the patient receives needed hospitalization. Wenger & Fletcher, supra note 10,
at 66-67.
194. Id. Compare Brandeis, J., dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928): "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficient. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understand-
ing. . . ." id. at 479, with statement of Zigmond Lebensohn, M.D., 1969-70 Hearings,
supra note 66, at 14: "[1It may be that our zeal for protecting the rights of the pa-
tient has to some extent, already hampered a desirable expedition in getting some
patients into treatment promptly."
195. See note 10 supra.
196. See generally ARIZONA PROJECT, supra note 8; Wenger & Fletcher, supra note
10.
197. See Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 23.
198. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
199. ARiZONA PROJEct, supra note 8, at 60.
200. Normally the professional in charge of the mental health facility is expected
to take the initiative and petition to have those individuals who require incarceration
to remain so incarcerated. See Fuller, supra note 20, at 77-79 n.13.
201. Id.
19741
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patients, and the physician must phrase classifications so that they
conform to the criteria in the bill.2"' Thus, a physician who wishes
to classify a patient as dangerous or gravely disabled in order that the
patient may be treated, can still manipulate the terms to reach the de-
sired result.
20 3
LPS does, however, change the role of the physician in some re-
spects. First, the bill removes civil liability from the medical staff for
anything a patient may do after release.20 4 If the possibility of public
censure causes physicians to "play it safe" when predicting dangerous
behavior, the removal of legal responsibility may reduce this tendency.20 '
A physician, however, is as much a part of the public as a lay person,
and as such, may feel that "moral" or "ethical" responsibility attaches to
an erroneous prediction of non-danger. Thus, the same community at-
titudes that existed prior to LPS may partially influence psychiatric
predictions.20 6
The provision of LPS which allows a patient to select his or her own
physician within the limits of the staff may also change the role of the
physician to some extent.207  The coercive nature of mental institu-
tions often creates a great deal of resentment in the patients, and they
commonly tend to look upon the physician as a jailer,2 08 but post-LPS
studies indicate that increased patient involvement in controlling at least
some aspects of the confinement has led to greater acceptance of hos-
pitalization.
20 9
Despite these minor improvements, LPS procedures still tend to
place the psychiatrist in an untouchable position. Some commentators
202. CAL. WEL. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5008(h) (West 1972).
203. See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text. Under LPS, this apparently
does not frequently occur. See note 260 infra.
204. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5267 (West 1972).
205. See notes 68-71 supra and accompanying text.
206. See generally Abramson, supra note 15, at 101.
207. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5009 (West 1972). But see note 139
supra.
208. See, A Form of Slavery, supra note 76, at 14.
209. One of the intentions of the L-P-S legislation was that there would be more
patient involvement in individual hospitalization, and a greater awareness of
events. This goal appeared to have been reached in that pre L-P-S 507'% of the pa-
tients were aware they were being hospitalized, while post L-P-S there was a sig-
nificant increase in the percent of patients who were aware of the process. ....
One can hypothesize that patients' greater awareness of the fact that they were
being hospitalized led to greater acceptance of the hospitalization. The greater
acceptance may also have been influenced by patient awareness of the 14-day lim-
itation on commitments. The important factor is that post L-P-S there was more
acceptance of the hospitalization, which, theoretically, facilitates treatment.
ENKI REPORT, supra note 20, at 119.
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have suggested that doctors enjoy this enviable status because they
are not required to explain the reasons upon which they base the ulti-
mate conclusion of "dangerous" or "gravely disabled"; 10 instead,
the psychiatrist is usually asked no more than whether or not a given
harm is likely, and the answer is usually confined to a mere 'yes" or
"nflo.2ll The clear implication of these contentions is that if someone
were to delve into the reasons upon which the expert based an opinion,
then the court could make a better judgment as to the validity of the
conclusions reached. Presumably, the attorney for the patient would,
on cross examination, be the one to perform the actual feat of eliciting
such information from the doctor.
Such an analysis, however, leaves much to be desired. It seems to
assume that the court, the attorney, and the jury (if there is one), can
understand the doctor's reasoning better than the ultimate conclusion.
Yet any time an expert is testifying in a legal action, whether it be an
engineer testifying as to the cause of an automobile accident or a physi-
cian testifying as to the standard of treatment in a medical malprac-
tice case, the point of the testimony is to have someone take a collec-
tion of facts which anyone can comprehend and draw from those facts
a conclusion which can be reached only by having the expert's special
training and background.2 12  For instance, in the case of an auto-
mobile accident, the engineer may use the length of a skid mark, the dis-
tance the automobile frame is crushed, and the final position in which
the automobile stopped as the basic facts, 21 3 all of which are perfectly
understandable by the lay person. But the engineer, using these facts,
will then proceed to determine the speed at which the automobile
was traveling when the accident occurred, a step in the deductive chain
of reasoning beyond the capabilities of the typical lay person. Similarly,
the psychiatrist will use as basic facts certain behavior on the part of the
patient, response to certain stimuli, etc., each of which is again compre-
hensible to the lay person.2" 4 Nevertheless, it takes training in psychiatry
to fit these facts together before one can reach a conclusion as to "men-
tal illness." The triers of fact are not in a position to determine
whether or not the psychiatrist has used all relevant data available,
210. See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 23.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 801 (West 1968).
213. See, e.g., Garcia v. Hoffman, 212 Cal. App. 2d 530, 534, 28 Cal. Rptr. 98, 101
(1963).
214. See generally J. BENTLEY, GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY, PRINCIPLES & PRATCE
(1947).
1974]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
whether or not all necessary data was made available, or whether or
not the doctor's reasoning process was correct, simply because they do
not know what data is required to make such a judgment or what the
proper steps in such an analysis are. Thus, a knowledge of the facts
and logic upon which the doctor bases a conclusion is highly unlikely
to change the result of a commitment hearing.
It would seem obvious, then, that the proper way to attack the prob-
lem arising from the "unimpeachable" position of psychiatrists is to at-
tack their credibility in the same manner that expert witnesses are
"impeached" in other types of legal proceedings, namely, through use
of opposing experts.21 5 As in all cases involving the "battle of ex-
perts," the trier of fact would simply determine which expert is the more
credible. Such an approach resolves a number of other problems of-
ten cited as stumbling blocks to fair hearings on the questions of "dan-
gerousness" and disability. First, it alleviates, to a great extent, diffi-
culties of communication: s"6 Attorneys no longer have to be the
equivalents of practicing psychiatrists,217 since they have experts of their
own to guide them to the proper lines of questioning and to indicate
areas where the opposing witness is weak or wrong. Analogies to auto-
mobile accident cases and medical malpractice actions are particu-
larly appropriate here. Comparatively few attorneys are knowledge-
able as engineers or as physicians, yet many are quite competent to
try such actions. They are competent because they know how to use
experts, not because they know what their experts know. Certainly, if
attorneys can effectively confront neurosurgeons and automotive en-
gineers, they should also be able to effectively impeach psychiatrists.
If this analysis is correct, then the basic conclusion must be that the
role of the psychiatrist in a commitment hearing should be no differ-
ent than the role played by any physician in any other type of
legal proceeding. And if this is true, it is up to the attorney represent-
ing the patient to insure that the committing physician plays no role in
excess of this. The only modification to LPS required to obtain this
result in all cases is a provision which allows indigent patients to ob-
tain psychiatric experts who will testify on the patient's behalf. 218 The
215. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109
Cal. Rptr. 110 (1973).
216. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
217. See note 255 infra and accompanying text.
218. LPS does not itself provide for the appointment of psychiatrists. There are,
however, provisions in various parts of the California codes which could possibly be
used for this purpose. See, e.g., CAL. Evin. CODE §§ 730-32 (West 1972), which allow
courts to appoint expert witnesses.
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rest of the solution is up to the patient's attorney. 219
E. Role of Counsel
The right to counsel in civil commitment proceedings is a statutory
guarantee in most jurisdictions. 220  In addition, there is a growing rec-
ognition that this legislative policy should be elevated to a constitu-
tional right.221  For example, in Heryford v. Parker 222 the Tenth Cir-
cuit relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in In re Gault22a to find a
constitutional right to counsel in civil commitment hearings.2 24  Gault
extended the right to counsel, 225 the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,226 the right to a judicial hearing, 227 and the right to cross-examine
witnesses2 28 to juveniles in delinquency proceedings. These rights were
accorded even though such proceedings are deemed civil rather than
criminal in nature.2 29  The Heryford court recognized that, like Gault,
civil commitment involves a situation in which an individual's liberty
is at stake:230 "It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled
'civil' or 'criminal' or whether the subject matter be mental instability
or juvenile delinquency." ''
The right to be represented by counsel is included within the Cali-
fornia commitment statute232 and the patient must be informed of this
right.2 33  In Thorn v. Superior Court,234 the California supreme court
219. See notes 220-60 infra and accompanying text.
220. ARIZONA PROJECT, supra note 8, at 32.
221. Id. See also People ex rel. Woodall v. Bigelow, 285 N.Y.S.2d 85, 231 N.E.2d
777 (1967).
222. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
223. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
224. It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or "criminar' or
whether the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the
likelihood of involuntary incarceration-whether for punishment as an adult for a
crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a
feeble-minded or mental incompetent-which commands observance of the consti-
tutional safeguards of due process. Where, as in both proceedings for juveniles and
mentally deficient persons, the state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the
inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process, and this necessarily includes the duty
to see that a subject of an involuntary commitment proceeding is afforded the op-
portunity to the guiding hand of legal counsel at every step of the proceeding, un-
less effectively waived by one authorized to act in his behalf.
396 F.2d at 396.
225. 387 U.S. at 41.
226. Id. at 55.
227. Id. at 33.
228. Id. at 56-57.
229. Id. at 30.
230. 396 F.2d at 396.
231. Id.
232. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 5276 (West 1972).
233. Id. § 5252.1
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upheld a superior court order that the legal staff of a nonprofit cor-
poration, established to provide legal services to indigents in San Diego
County, visit all persons detained for intensive psychiatric treatment
under the provisions of the LPS.235  The right to counsel was thus ex-
tended to patients even if they had not specifically requested counsel.
Noting that the circumstances of confinement create difficult problems,
the court stressed the importance of assuring "that the patient's rights
receive meaningful protection. ' 236  Many of these individuals lack the
capacity to understand the rights that are provided them, and as a re-
sult, it is necessary for the courts to set forth particular procedures to
guard these rights.237 In approving the procedure used by the superior
court in Thorn, the court did not establish any specific requirements
for other courts to follow. 238  The court did note, however, some sug-
gestions offered by the Citizens Advisory Council created by the Short-
Doyle Act:
239
(1) that the certificated person be provided with counsel at the time
he receives written notice of certification under section 5252; (2) that
counsel or some other third person not connected with the treatment fa-
cility be present at the time the patient's right to a hearing is ex-
plained to him; (3) that a third party-the patient's attorney, the pub-
lic defender, or the mental health counselor-visit the patient imme-
diately after the notice of certification is submitted to the court and
other parties as required by section 5253.240
The court concluded that any of the suggested procedures would pro-
vide the patient with adequate protection, but declined to establish any
rigid rules.241
234. 1 Cal. 3d 666, 464 P.2d 56, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1970).
235. Id. at 676, 464 P.2d at 61, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
236. Id. at 675, 464 P.2d at 62, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
237. Id.
238. [I]t would appear that any one of the suggested procedures [see text accom-
panying notes 169-74 supra] would provide adequate protection to the patient
in any particular case, and that this court should not undertake to lay down rigid
rules on the subject, but instead should only suggest ground rules which ....
will provide guidelines to those charged with carrying out the provisions of the
LPS Act.
Id. at 676, 464 P.2d at 63, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
239. CA. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANr. § 5763 (West 1972) creates a Citizens Advi-
sory Council of 15 citizens, including mental health professionals, who are appointed
by the Governor, the President of the Senate, the Chairman of the Senate Rules Com-
mittee, and the Speaker of the Assembly. The Council filed an amicus brief in Thorn.
1 Cal. 3d at 674 n.8, 464 P.2d at 62 n.8, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.8.
240. 1 Cal. 3d at 675-76, 464 P.2d at 62-63, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 606-07 (footnotes
omitted).
241. Id. at 676, 464 P.2d at 63, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
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While the "right to counsel" is thus firmly established both in Cali-
fornia and other jurisdictions, the question of the role to be played by
counsel is unresolved. Regrettably, the simple presence of counsel can-
not be equated with "effective" counsel. Bruce J. Ennis, of the New
York Civil Liberties Union, told the Senate Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Rights that "assigned lawyers [for mental patients] are fre-
quently worthless." 242
The role attorneys actually play in the commitment hearing is in-
deed disturbing. 43 Most people would expect an attorney to take an
active part in any legal proceeding, but this is not always the case in the
civil commitment process.2 44  Many hearings give the impression of
being merely a "rubber stamp" of the psychiatrist's decision, and not
a true adversary process. 245 One indicator of this is the length of the
proceedings. The shorter the hearing, the less time spent questioning
the medical recommendation.2 4  From the psychiatrist's point of view
this procedure is less harmful to the patient than a long judicial pro-
ceeding which could be anti-therapeutic. 24 7
242. Statement of Bruce Ennis in 1969-70 Hearings, supra note 66, at 286. But
see Wenger & Fletcher, supra note 10. These authors indicate that there is evidence
that the simple presence of an attorney at the hearing may be an asset to the patient.
One study of one hundred admissions at a midwestern state hospital showed a high
correlation (.942) between the presence of an attorney and the decision not to commit
a person to the hospital. This is inconclusive, as it is possible, in light of other evi-
dence on the role of counsel, that the mere presence of counsel was not the only
variable. It is conceivable that individuals who would normally be judged legally
sane would be more likely to secure the assistance of legal counsel. This is very prob-
able when one considers the fact that the court went along with the psychiatrist's rec-
ommendation in virtually all cases, thus seeming to indicate that the lawyer had little
real effect on the outcome. Id. at 66-72.
243. Of course, the attorney may also play an interesting and important role out-
side the hearing room in terms of counseling the client and in terms of investigation.
See ARIZONA PROJECt, supra note 8, at 55.
244. A study of commitment hearings in Arizona indicates the following conclusions
about court appointed lawyers functioning in this area of the law:
It appears from the data that not even the most elementary legal questions are ex-
plored, such as (1) whether the decision to commit is to be based on dangerous-
ness to self or to the person or property of others; (2) whether there is any real
factual basis for such a conclusion; (3) whether possible alternatives to involun-
tary comitment exist or have ever been explored; (4) whether medical examina-
tions were thorough .. .; and (5) whether the doctor's recommendation is based
on factual or conclusory data.
Id. at 54.
245. Id. at 38-60.
246. In a case study made in Travis County, Texas, the attorney asked no questions
of the psychiatrists. He did not study the court files to determine if proper notice
had been given. Forty patients were committed at a hearing where the role of the
attorney was largely ceremonial. Taylor, A Critical Look Into the Involuntary
Civil Commitment Procedure, 10 WAsunmuRN L.J. 237, 256-57 (1971).
247. See Wegner & Fletcher, supra note 10, at 66.
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Often the psychiatrist is asked to state an opinion, and the defendant
is pronounced mentally ill without additional questioning. After a few
minutes in court, the patient is taken away to an institution. In one
study of commitments before a mental health commission, the average
length of the hearings was 4.7 minutes, with some being less than
three.2 45 Another study showed the average length at 8.13 minutes,
the median at 5.3 minutes, and the range from 0.45 minutes to al-
most 45 minutes.2 49  One patient had not even been examined by a
psychiatrist prior to his hearing, yet the proceeding lasted only 4.5
minutes.
250
Various explanations for this situation have been advanced by com-
mentators on the subject. One is that attorneys worry that their posi-
tion as leaders in the courtroom might become subordinate to that of
the psychiatrists.251 Psychiatrists in turn tend to feel that this is essen-
tially a medical area and dislike the intrusion of the law into the psy-
chiatric field2 52 The conflict between the two professions is then nego-
tiated into an uneasy peace where lawyers appear to play the ma-
jor role in the courtroom while the actual show is being directed by
the psychiatrists.2 53  This trade-off between the two professions allows
the hearing to go smoothly, with the appearance of all the legal safe-
guards, and still nothing prevents the patient from receiving "necessary"
hospitalization.
This explanation is unsatisfying. If it is true, civil commitment is the
only area where attorneys ever allow another profession to control
courtroom proceedings. Again, analogies to medical malpractice ac-
tions and tort cases involving automobile accident reconstruction are
instructive. 254  That the physician and engineer feel that they are bet-
ter equipped to decide an issue does not seem to inhibit attorneys from
completely dominating trial proceedings.
Another explanation which has been advanced is that lawyers are
just beginning to receive adequate training in this area of the law,255
perhaps because it is still considered by many to be primarily a medi-
cal problem. Often the phrasing of the issues in medical terms will
248. AmRZoNA PROJECT, supra note 8, at 38-39.
249. Wenger & Fletcher, supra note 10, at 69.
250. Id. at 68 n.5.
251. "Psychiatric and legal professions compete in their claims to expertise and de-
cision-making authority regarding hospital commitment." Id. at 67.
252. Id. at 66-68.
253. Id. at 68.
254. See text accompanying note 212 suprt.
255. See ARizoNA PROJECT, supra note 8, at 34; Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 21.
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"frighten-or bore-lawyers away. ' 250  This contention is as unac-
ceptable as the "protection of identity" argument, and for similar rea-
sons. Few attorneys have training in neurosurgery, internal medicine,
automotive engineering, or a host of other subjects which are the
bases of actions brought and prosecuted daily by scores of lawyers.
There is no obvious reason why psychiatric medicine should be any
more "frightening" or require any more "training" than the other areas
with which attorneys constantly grapple.
The only explanation which seems to fit the available data is that
attorneys most often agree with the psychiatrist that the person should
be committed and therefore do not offer the type of "defense" one
would expect in a normal legal proceeding. This is strikingly dem-
onstrated by a case in which the attorney for the client took the stand
during the commitment hearing and testified that his client should be
committed.257  If attorneys in fact acquiesce to psychiatric judgments
because the attorneys agree with them, then the underlying problem in
all civil commitment proceedings is basically to define the duties an
attorney owes to the client. Should attorneys "roll over and play dead"
when they agree with the psychiatrist? Or should they, as in criminal
cases, assume that it is their duty to force the "prosecution" to prove
its case irrespective of the persons' actual mental condition or the at-
torneys' personal conclusions about the merits of .the psychiatric con-
clusions? Or is there perhaps some more neutral ground which should
be taken, such as simply ensuring that the psychiatrist's suggested treat-
ment is the least restrictive but still useful alternative? For instance,
the attorney might believe that a conservator should be appointed, but
that commitment is not necessary,258 and would then oppose commit-
ment, but would accede to the appointment of a conservator without
argument.
It would seem that if the object of civil commitment is to insure
that only those persons who actually need institutionalization are in fact
committed, then the only real choice is for the attorney to approach a
civil commitment proceeding as one would approach a criminal pro-
ceeding. The attorney must force the persons who are trying to com-
mit the client to prove their case, as that term is understood in other
proceedings, or one is simply not fulfilling necessary obligations to the
256. Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 21.
257. ARIZONA PROJECT, supra note 8, at 53.
258. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text. See also In re Basso, 299 F.2d
933 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Mazza v. Pechacek, 233 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Prochaska
v. Brinegan, 102 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1960); Hussman v. Hursh, 92 N.W.2d 673 (Minn.
1958); In re Moynihan, 62 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. 1933).
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client; instead of representing them, the lawyer has become a mere
adjunct to the client's adversaries.
As might be expected, LPS does not address itself to this problem,
nor is it likely that it is a problem which lends itself to statutory solu-
tion. While it would be possible to add some statement of the law-
yer's duties to the Code of Professional Responsibility,2 the only sat-
isfactory method of remedying the situation would appear to be wide-
spread educational efforts to inculcate attorneys with the same feeling
toward the mentally ill that they presently have toward those ac-
cused of crimes. 60 For the present, one can only conclude that the
attitude of the bar toward mental commitment hearings reflects a
disquieting lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the adversary
system.
CONCLUSION
When it first became law, LPS was both hailed and criticized.
20 1
Some marked it as a breakthrough that would guarantee the mentally
ill much deserved constitutional rights; others regarded it as an impedi-
ment to needed treatment and a threat to the safety of the community.
In the area of providing treatment, the conclusions of the ENKI
Report indicate that the legislation has not had the negative effect on
therapy forecast by critics. Nevertheless, LPS in some ways has failed
to live up to the predictions that it would provide effective guarantees
of constitutional rights. Specific procedures are still lacking to insure
that involuntarily incarcerated individuals receive the guiding hand of
effective counsel; the definitional standards, while certainly more specific
than those of other jursdictions, are still so vague that the psychiatrist
can manipulate them to assure that the individual will receive the bene-
fits of "needed hospitalization"; and prevailing community attitudes
cause people to resort to the criminal justice system as an alternative
to civil commitment.
In the area of the right to treatment, there is considerable question
as to whether hospitalization is the best alternative for most mentally
ill individuals. Case law, as well as medical research, is still inconclu-
sive as to the nature of adequate treatment. Nevertheless, attorneys
259. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILMY (1969).
260. Recent evidence indicates that some attorneys are developing this attitude.
See ENKI REPORT, supra note 20: "In many cases the writ [of habeas corpus] was
granted because public defenders began requiring that treatment staff testify in court.
. ld. at 181.
261. See generally Bazelon, supra note 20 (in support of LPS); Fuller, supra note
20 (questioning LPS); Abramson, supra note 15 (highly critical of LPS).
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for the mentally ill should be prepared to explore alternatives to hos-
pitalization where such alternatives are realistic.
Civil commitment in California continues to be a confrontation be-
tween the legal and medical professions. To be sure, society may
have an obligation to insure that every individual receive necessary
medical treatment, and it certainly has a right to protect itself from dan-
gerous individuals. But whenever individuals face the possibility of
being deprived of their liberty, society should assume the responsi-
bility to provide a truly adversary proceeding with all of the due pro-
cess protections inherent in the criminal justice system.262 The psychia-
trist must not be allowed to remain in the position of an "unimpeach-
able expert." As long as the law considers commitment to be a legal
proceeding, the issues raised are ultimately legal, not medical. It is
for the bar to develop a body of attorneys who are trained in this area
of the law and who are capable of providing effective legal assistance to
mentally ill individuals.
But most importantly, the bar must develop an approach to the com-
mitment of the mentally ill similar to that taken in the criminal area.
Attorneys must treat the mentally ill as clients whose rights are endan-
gered by the process of commitment, and who deserve the best possible
defense. This would automatically lessen the impact of other weak-
nesses in LPS and other problems associated with civil commitment in
general. First, it would force the commiting psychiatrist back into the
role normally played by physicians testifying in lawsuits, i.e., they
would become mere expert witnesses, whose testimony is to be im-
peached not only through cross examination, but also through rebuttal
testimony from other psychiatrists. The vagueness of the definitional
standards becomes less important also, since careful rebuttal testimony
should be able to point out this very vagueness to the trier of fact, who
would then become aware, as is apparently not the case at present, that
the committing psychiatrist may be manipulating the standards to reach
what is believed to be a desirable result.
The California experiment does provide a good working model for
other jurisdictions to emulate and perhaps improve upon. As Judge
262. But see Statement of William J. Curran, Professor of Law, Boston University,
in 1969-70 Hearings, supra note 66, at 26:
In the past 100 years mental illness has been far the most legally regulated sickness
in the United States. In spite of all this, there is little evidence that this legal
attention has done mental patients much good. Law and government have played
"Big Brother is watching you" with the mentally ill for a century. Another ap-
proach may now be advisable. Less law rather than more may be the answer for
the future.
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Bazelon indicates, however, "Only experience will reveal whether Cali-
fornia can truly end involuntary commitments as a principal response
to mental illness, and avoid the potential sequelae of voluntary com-
mitments which are the product of subtle coercion."2"3  If nothing
else, California has abandoned attempts to resolve the problem of the
mental patient by telling the inquiring mind to "Ask your mother."
The surest test if a man be sane
Is if he accepts life whole, as it is,
Without needing by measure or touch to understand
The measureless untouchable source
Of its images,
The measureless untouchable source
Of its substances,
The source which, while it appears dark emptiness,
Brims with a quick force
Farthest away
And yet nearest at Hand
From oldest time unto this day,
Changing its images with origin:
What more need I know of the origin
Than this?
-Lao Tzu204
Mark Alan Hart
263. Bazelon, supra note 20, at 108.
264. LAo Tzu, THE WAY Op Lim' 37 (W. Bynner trans. 1962).
[Vol. 7
